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Love's Labor's Lost:
Marry for Love, Copyright Work Made-for-Hire,
and Alienate at your Leisure
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons'
What's love got to do, got to do with it?
What's love but a sweet old-fashioned notion?
-Tina Turner2
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state courts have fecklessly faced the vexatious problem
of allocating federal rights in copyrights created during a marriage using
principles of state law.3 Copyrights are property rights that are created
under federal law and whose initial ownership is governed exclusively
by federal law.4 Strong Congressionally declared federal public policies
relating to balancing public (user) rights and author incentives strive to
create a uniform national copyright regime.5 On the other hand, marriage
is a uniquely state institution, and federal and state courts have indulged
in every permissible presumption in order to avoid finding state laws
governing marriage, marital property, and its status at the dissolution of the
I Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. The author would like to
thank his research assistant John Powers and acknowledge the valuable comments of partici-
pants of the University of Toledo College of Law zoo Half-Baked Ideas Workshop; Franklin
Pierce Intellectual Property Law Center (University of New Hampshire) Inaugural Intellec-
tual Property Academic Conference; 2oi i Annual Meeting Central States Law School Asso-
ciation; the Drake University School of Law 2012 Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable;
and Professors Ann Bartow and Marina Angel, for their succinct advice. Finally, the author
would like to thank the editors and staff of the Kentucky Law Journal for their hard work
and many useful editorial suggestions that improved this article immeasurably. As always,
the opinions expressed in this article as well as the many errors and omissions are solely the
responsibility of the author despite the hard work of his administrative assistant Diane Bohn
to save him from his own errors.
2 TINA TURNER, What's Love Got to Do with It, on PRIvATE DANCER (Capitol Records 1984).
3 See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue I1), 218 F3d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 2000); Worth v.
Worth (In re Marriage of Worth), 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage
of Heinze, 631 N.E.zd 728, 729 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); Boutz v. Donaldson, 991 P.2d 517, 524-25
(N.M. 1999).
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (zoo6) ("Copyright... vests initially in the author ... .
5 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989); H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5659-60.
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marriage preempted by federal law.6 In order to do justice, if not law, courts
have been remarkably creative in finding novel procrustean interpretations
of copyright law in a vain attempt to harmonize Congress's statutory
commands with sui generis state community property law principles., .
This article will consider who owns a copyright created by an, author-
spouse (or cohabiting partner) during the relationship and then analyze
whether substituting the romantic institution of the marriage partnership
with a business entity partnership may yield a result that is more consistent
with the statutory norms of copyright law. This article will focus on the
copyright issues that arise in a community property jurisdiction in the
context of dissolution proceedings. However, the potential application of
its thesis is much wider and, in principle, may apply equally as well in
common law jurisdictions using an equitable distribution model;8 in states
providing some legal protections for cohabitating individuals, for example,
6 See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 58I (1979) (citing United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)) ("State family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to
'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state
law be overridden."); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Myers, 488 F Supp. 704, 707 (M.D. La.
1980) ("We start with the proposition that the delicate relationships of husband-wife, parent-
child and family-property arrangements are traditionally matters of exclusive state concern.
No provision of Article I of the Constitution confers power upon the Congress to legislate in
these sensitive state fields. Any general federal law attempting to regulate such relationships
would be constitutionally infirm. If the Tenth Amendment reserved any powers to the states,
it must be the power to legislate the rules applicable to marriage, separation and divorce, com-
munity property and succession."), aff'd, 645 E2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981).
7 See Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connec-
tion, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S. 382,397-98 (io).
8 See, e.g., Teller v. Teller, 53 P.3d 240, 246-47 (Haw. 2002); In re Marriage of Heinze, 631
N.E.2d at 731 (stating that the definition of marital property in Illinois, a common law jurisdic-
tion, "is very similar to California's definition of community property[]" when dividing royal-
ties from books written during marriage); see also Ann Bartow, Intellectual Property and Domestic
Relations: Issues to Consider When There Is an Artist, Author, Inventor, or Celebrity in the Family,
35 FAM. L.Q. 383, 412 & n.15z (2001) (noting that characterization of copyrights for divorce
purposes will arise in the context of equitable distribution); Nevins, Jr., supra note 7, at 388
(highlighting the presence of the preemption problem in equitable distribution jurisdictions
as well as community property jurisdictions).
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a meretricious relations state;9 or in states following the California Supreme
Court's seminal holding in Marvin v. Marvin.'°
This article concludes that a less romantic view of the commerce of the
marital relationship and a more commercial view of romantic marriage as a
business entity will better effectuate the public policies concerning marriage
as an economic institution and the use of copyrights' constitutional polices
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Courts should not
change their understanding of the general laws governing copyright; rather,
courts should adopt a realistic understanding of marriage as the legal and
functional equivalent of.a business entity partnership and treat the author-
spouse's copyrighted works as a work-made-for-hire under the Copyright
Act. Courts have had centuries of experience addressing the economic
rights and obligations of a couple at the dissolution of their marriage when
the marital assets consisted of mostly tangible property." Modern wealth
is no longer necessarily based solely on titles to real estate or ownership
of tangible objects; it can include wealth from intangible rights, including
intellectual property or other new forms of property." While the law of real
and personal property is largely a state body of law, often the law governing
intangible rights in the area of copyright is federal law. 3
9 Under Washington law, "'[a] meretricious relationship is a stable, marital-like relation-
ship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does
not exist."' Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3 d 552, 555 (Wash. 2007) (quoting Connell v. Francisco, 898
P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995)). Only property deemed community property in a marriage is subject
to a just and equitable distribution upon dissolution of a meretricious relationship. Id. & n.3.
So, Washington's meretricious relationship law also potentially poses the same problems that
community property laws pose for the post-marital allocation of copyrights. See Gavin M. Parr,
What Is a "Meretricious Relationship"?: An Analysis of Cohabitant Property Rights Under Connell
v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (1999) (describing the meretricious relationship as
having a "pseudo-community property" character).
1o See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d io6, Iio (Cal. 1976) ("In the absence of an express
contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that
conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum
meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of
the case.") (emphasis added). See generally HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAw OF CONTRACTS
§ 24:7 (2012) (discussing cases following Marvin as applied in Nevada, Maryland, Missouri,
Arizona, Wisconsin, District of Columbia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Colorado).
1' See, e.g., Stockton v. Knock, I5 P 51, 52 (Cal. 1887); Palmer v. Palmer, I Paige Ch. 276,
277-78 (N.Y. Ch. 1828); Trimble v. Trimble, 15 Tex. 18, 19 (i 85).
12 See generally Susan Eisenberg, Intangible Takings, 6o VANI. L. REV. 667, 696-700 (2007)
(elaborating on the concept of virtual property); Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human
Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1987) (highlighting the
impact of human capital on divorce property settlements); Sally Brown Richardson, How Com-
munity Property Jurisdictions Can AvoidBeingLost in Cyberspace, 72 LA. L. REV. 89,91-100 (2011)
(discussing virtual property in the context of social media).
13 Raymond T Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information Prop-
erty Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 201 (1987).
2012-2013]
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Naturally, changing existing copyright legislation would be a much
simpler solution than reconsidering the centuries-old conception of
marriage to conform it to modern principles of partnership and copyright
law."4 So far, though, Congress has shown little inclination to change the
existing Copyright Act. Further, the preemption problems presented by
this article as justification for its solution are easily skirted through the use
of prenuptial or postnuptial agreements."s As an alternative to congressional
action, the federal courts could craft a rule of federal common law to
displace state law in this area. Further, state legislatures or state courts could
determine as a matter of state law that copyrights are separate property or
otherwise out of the marital estate when awarding marital property. As of
the writing of this article, none of these alternative solutions appear to be
under consideration.
I. THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROBLEM
Under state law domestic relations paradigms, state courts face questions
of federal preemption when forced to allocate an author-spouse's or
author-cohabitant's copyright assets in the course of adjudicating property
claims arising out of the winding-up of a legally cognizable relationship.
16
There are three predominant legal 'models of domestic relations that
govern the post-dissolution allocation of property accumulated during the
relationship. Individual states may be roughly divided into two groups:
states where the economic relationship between spouses is defined by
principles arising out of the common law, and states whose marital laws
governing the economic relationship between spouses arise out of the •
civil law ("community property" states). 7 While there are two distinct
14 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue ), F. Supp. zd 534, S47 (E.D. La. t999), rev'don
other grounds, 218 E3d 432 (5tfi Cif. 2000).
15 See Nevins, Jr., supra note 7, at 406; Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Con-
straints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. IO9, 18o (zoo6).
16 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 6.05 (2002) ("Domestic-partnership property should be divided according to the principles
set forth for the division of marital property in § 4.09 and § 4.1o."). Further discussion of
meretricious relationships, Marvin v. Marvin cohabitation agreements, and the Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution would unnecessarily lengthen an already exceedingly verbose law
review article.
17 The following states are essentially "community property" states: Arizona, Califor-
nia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. E.g., WILLIAM
BASSETT, BASSETT ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 1:4 (2011 ed.). For the pur-
poses of the Copyright Act, Puerto Rico, a civil law jurisdiction, is considered a state. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006). In Alaska, the couple may voluntarily agree in writing to treat property acquired
after marriage as community property. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (2010). Moreover, some
non-community property states recognize community property rights that were created while
the married couple was living in a community property state. See, e.g., JOHN PARKER HUGGARD,
NORTH CAROLINA ESTATE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE GUIDE § 30:8 (2012).
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bodies of family property law, the two systems have some similarities, and
some common law jurisdictions borrow "community property" definitions
of marital property.18 So, judicial decisions in a community property
jurisdiction may be persuasive authority in common law states.' 9 Also,
there are states that recognize interests in property that is acquired during
cohabitationiunder either the Marvin v. Marvin model or the meretricious
relations model.2 0
II. COPYRIGHT
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the legal ownership of a
copyright has been problematic because state laws governing "ownership"
of a copyrighted work created during the marriage may deviate significantly
from the federal norm of copyright ownership.' Under the 1976 Copyright
Act, copyright automatically subsists in original works of authorship fixed
in a tangible medium of expression by or under the authority of the author"
and, at the moment of fixation, the copyright is immediately vested in the
author. 3
The statutory norm for the transfer of a copyright ownership, other
than by operation of law, is that the transfer is voluntary, in writing, and
signed by the author or the author's agent.14 To be the owner of a copyright,
one merely has to have an exclusive claim to afiy part of one or more of
the'rights granted to the author under § 106.5 However, the devil is in
i8 See, e.g., In re Marriage of leinze, 631 N.E.zd 728, 731 (ll. App. Ct. 1994)'(finding
Illinois's (common law jurisdiction) definition of marital property is "very similar to Califor-
nia's definition of community property[]" when dividing royalties to books written during
marriage).
19 Id. (describing California cases as persuasive).
20 See Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309,315-16 (2oo8) ("Appellate courts in at least twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have now approved some relational contract claims [like that in Marvin v. Marvin]
between cohabitants...."); Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventursses: The Abolition
and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483,529-30 (2007) (dis-
cussing the meretricious relations model).
21 To simplify the model discussed in this article, the copyrighted works described in the
article were all initially created under the 1976 Act and published post-January I, 1978. See
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.0 (Supp. 2012).
22 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2oo6).The term "fixed" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 1O5.
23 17 U.S.C. § zoi(a) (2oo6); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,493-94 (2001).
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 20i(a), (e); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 9o8 F2d 555, 556-57 (9th Cir.
199o). Transfers of permission to use the copyright that is less than "ownership," such as a
non--exclusive license, may be done orally or in any other manner that conveys the copyright
owner's assent to the use of the copyrighted work. Seeid. at 558.
25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) ("'Copyright owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right."). A narrow grant
of an exclusive right to show a motion picture (§ io6(3) public performance right) in a specific
2012-20131
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the details or in this case, in § 101, the definition section. "A 'transfer of
copyright ownership' is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of
fhe exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in
time or place of effect, [excluding] a nonexclusive license."2 6
"Ownership" under copyright law is not congruent with the common lay
usage of the term "ownership." For example, many non-copyright lawyers
would not view a mortgage or a pledge of collateral under U.C.C. Article
9 as a transfer of ownership; however, these transactions are transfers of
ownership under the Copyright Act. 7 Under copyright law, the ownership
of the intangible statutory bundle of rights granted to the author under
§ '106 is legally distinct from the ownership of the tangible work which
instantiates or fixes the copyright."8 In addition to acts of "assignment,"
"conveyance," and "alienation," the so-called lesser grants of rights such
as mortgage or hypothecation are also considered transfers of copyright
ownership. 9
Section 201(d) provides that the ownership of a copyright may be
transferred by any means of conveyance, operation of law bequest, or may
pass as personal property through intestate succession.3" The "operation by
law" provision of§ 201(d) is specifically limited by § 201(e) which expressly
provides that
[w]hen an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously
been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action
by any governmental body or other official or organization
purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title,
except as provided under title 11 [bankruptcy proceedings]. 31
By its own terms, § 201(e) preempts all state laws purporting to transfer
copyright ownership prior to the first voluntary grant by the individual
classroom (room ioio) at the College of Law to a limited number of law students (not more
than 2o) between 7:30 and 9:30 pm on October 3, 2012 constitutes a transfer of copyright
ownership as long as there is a signed writing. See id. ("'transfer of copyright ownership' is an
,.. exclusive license[] ... of a copyright[,] ... whether or not it is limited in time or place of
effect .. "); Effects Assocs., 908 E2d at 556.
26 17 U.S.C. § 101.
27 Id.; In reWorld Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149, 151 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999).
28 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2oo6).
29 17 U.S.C. § io. Hypothecation is roughly analogous to-a lien or an agreement using
collateral as security for a loan under U.C.C. Article 9. SeeIn re Richman, I81 B.R. z6o, 262-65
(Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
30 17 U.S.C. § 20 I(d)( j) (2oo6); see also id. § 204(a). "[Section] 204(a) does not define the
term 'operation of law."' Brooks v. Bates, 781 E Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
31 17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
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author.3" Consequently, after the first voluntary transfer of a copyright by
the author, the transferred copyright becomes merely another species of
personal property that can be transferred by operation of state law from
subsequent owners of the copyright.33
III. COPYRIGHT As AN ASSET IN DIVORCE
In a community property state, marital property may be held either
separately or as part of the community. Separate property belongs solely
to the individual spouse. Community property belongs to the marital
community, and upon dissolution of that community, the property must
then be partitioned. 34 If state law treated copyrights as separate property
owned solely by the author-spouse then there would be no federal
preemption issues. However, courts have found that through operation of
state law, copyrights to works created during marriage were vested in the
marital estate and therefore were subject to division upon dissolution of
the marriage.3
This section will first review the dilemma posed by adjudicating rights
to a federal copyright in a state court proceeding, then analyze the problems
of adjudicating copyright ownership in the context of a community property
state marriage dissolution proceeding. It will then review In re Marriage of
Worth and Rodigue v. Rodrigue, the two leading cases on the role of state
law and copyright ownership in the context of marriage dissolution in two
different community property states; analyze marital ownership rights in
a copyrighted work created during the marriage; discuss the Copyright
Act's three express preemption provisions (17 U.S.C. § 301(a), 17 U.S.C. §
301(f), and 17 U.S.C. § 201(e));' and conclude that state laws purporting to
32 Id. Section 20i(e) also appears to preclude involuntary transfers under federal law, ex-
cept in the limited case of bankruptcy proceedings under Title I I of the United States Code.
33 A leading commentator contends that a "transfer of ownership of copyright may be
effectuated by 'operation of law' rather than by 'conveyance,' such operation of law must
be triggered by the express or implied consent of the author." 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § Io.03[al (1997). Thus a § 204(a) transfer by operation of
law, unless voluntary, is constrained by § 2oi(e)'s prohibition against involuntary transfers. See
Bates, 781 F. Supp. at 265.
34 See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, To-
getherrwith Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 79-81 (198 1).
35 As noted by one commentator,
In recent years, all state courts [including those in equitable distribution juris-
dictions] that have addressed the issue have either assumed or have explicitly
held that copyrights, and the royalties therefrom, are marital (or community)
property to the extent that the copyrighted work or profits therefrom were gen-
crated by spousal labor during marriage.
2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 23.07 [11-[2, at 23-120 to -121 (Mat-
thew Bender & Co. 2012).
36 See 2 WILLIAM E, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § I8:1 & § 5:1 x6 (2012) [hereinafter PATRY ON
2012-2013]
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transfer copyrights between married or cohabiting partners are preempted
by the Copyright Act.37
A. Exclusive Federal Court Copyright Jurisdiction, Exclusive State Court
Marriage Dissolution Proceedings
Many of the ownership issues presented by federal copyright law in
a state divorce proceeding will never be properly adjudicated by a court
of competent jurisdiction unless the underlying copyright dispute in the
state-court case is ultimately determined by the United States Supreme
Court.38 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction if the controversy
requires a construction of the Copyright Act.39 Under the test established
in TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, an action arises under the Copyright Act
"if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act[] .. .or
asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act[] . .. or,... perhaps more
doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires
that federal principles control the disposition of the claim." 4 Issues of
authorship and ownership under copyright law, including whether consent
to marry constitutes a voluntary prospective transfer of the copyright and
whether there is a valid transfer of the copyright by operation of state law,
are questions arising under the Copyright Act that require an authoritative
construction of the Copyright Act. For this reason, the federal courts have
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.4 Unfortunately, while construction
CoPYRIGHT] (copyright preemption provisions).
37 Compare i-6A MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6A.o3[A]
(2012) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] ("Thus, despite the absence of any legislative
history on the subject or decisional guidance over the many decades that copyright and com-
munity property have coexisted, logic would dictate that the community property laws should
be held pre-empted."), with i-6A NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6A.03[C][2][b] ("Accordingly, the
application of community property laws to copyrighted works stands or falls based on whether
married authors have at least implicitly consented to transfers of their works. As already noted,
one can plausibly maintain that such "consent" automatically accompanies the decision to
marry. Absent such consent, however, Worth's holding cannot comply with the Copyright Act,
and hence would clearly be pre-empted.") (footnote omitted).
38 See5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 36, § 17:38. Cf. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.2d 643
(Tex. 201 I), cert. granted, 2012 WL 831493 (Oct. 5, 2012) (construing the analogous "arising
under" provision in the patent context, noting that "other courts have deemed federal pat-
ent issues substantial when the determination of the patent issue establishes the success or
failure of an overlying state-law claim," and holding that there was no state court jurisdiction
in a state tort based attorney malpractice action requiring a construction of the "experimental
use" exception in patent law).
39 T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964); see Int'l Armor & Limousine
Co. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 E3d 912, 915-16 (7th Cir. 2001).
40 TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828.
41 See 5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 36, § 17:38; cf. Goodman v. Lee, 78 F3d 1007,
101 1-12 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding proper jurisdiction because the plaintiff sought to establish
co-authorship under the Copyright Act, which necessitated interpretation of the ownership
[Vol. IOI
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of the Copyright Act is vested exclusively in federal courts, construction of
state family law statutes and adjudication of divorce proceedings are vested
exclusively in the state courts.4"
The statutory provisions granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising under the Copyright Act and the prudential policies
permitting the federal courts to avoid resolving family law matters that are
best left to state court judges are not impermeable barriers to a resolution of
copyright issues in community property states.43 The questions of copyright
ownership that appear as part of the marital dissolution proceedings may
also be brought as a declaratory judgment action in federal court, either
separately litigated as part of a copyright infringement action or wholly
removed from state to federal court.' However, these issues will never
be presented to a federal court as part of a divorce action. While under
limited circumstances some federal courts may be permitted to certify a
question of state law to state courts, 4 there is no corresponding process that
enables a state court to get an authoritative interpretation of the federal
copyright laws from the federal courts (which are charged by Congress with
the exclusive duty to interpret and to develop a uniform national body of
copyright law).46
provisions of the Act); Merchant v. Levy, 92 F3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that whether
a work is a work-for-hire requires a construction of the Copyright Act). See also Minton v.
Gunn, 355 S.W.2d 634, 639-40 (Tex. zoi i) ("One form of 'arising under' federal-question
jurisdiction stems from 'state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues."') (citations
omitted).
42 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-65 (1995) (limiting Congress's power to
regulate family life under the Commerce Clause). The prudential reluctance of federal courts
to involve themselves in state domestic relations matters is of long standing. See, e.g., Exparte
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,593-96 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 603-05 (1858).
43 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)
("...[Blut neither have we treated 'federal issue' as a password opening federal courts to any
state action embracing a point of federal law. Instead, the question is, does a state-law claim
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal fo-
rum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state ju-
dicial responsibilities.") (emphasis added); cf De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)
(discussing whether illegitimate children were statutory heirs under the i 909 Copyright Act).
44 See Rodnigue 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540-46 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'don other grounds, Ro-
drigue 11, 218 F3d 432,442 (5th Cir. 2000), which addressed the issue of copyright ownership
in the context of a summary judgment action. The issue may also arise in copyright infringe-
ment litigation since one of the elements of infringement is copyright ownership. See, e.g.,
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). But c Stein v. Soyer, No.
97 Civil 1317 (MBM), 1997 WL 104967, at *' (S.D.N.Y Mar. 10, 1997) (rejecting removal due
to lack of a judiciable controversy).
45 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1544 (1997) ("[Florty-three states now permit at
least some federal courts to certify unsettled questions of state law to the highest court of the
state for authoritative resolution.").
46 See Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question..., 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
2012-2013] 121
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Consequently, one significant flaw is that a copyright ownership dispute
that requires an interpretation of federal law will never be settled until
a federal court authoritatively adjudicates the issue.47 For example, if a
state court awards copyright ownership to the spouse (instead of the actual
author) then the issues of ownership may be re-litigated in federal court
in a subsequent infringement action because ownership of the copyright
is one element of a prima facie case 6f copyright infringement. 48 This
indeterminacy of title results in additional financial burdens on the parties,
difficulties exploiting certain works because of their questionable title, and
unnecessary collateral litigation. Regrettably, as the law now stands, federal
copyright law and state domestic relations law will continue to develop
as parallel and potentially inconsistent bodies of law regarding authorship
and ownership of a copyright. This may require re-litigation of state law
domestic relations awards in federal courts as collateral matters related to
other copyright actions.
49
B. In re Marriage.of Worth
In re Marriage of Worth presented the first opportunity for either a state
or federal court to opine on the ownership of the copyright (under the
1976 Copyright Act) of a work created during the marriage in a community
property state.50 In Worth, the parties had already agreed to allocate their
respective interests in the royalties resulting from the copyrighted works
created during the marriage."1 The author-spouse then commenced a
copyright infringement action against the producers of the "Trivial Pursuit"
board game.5" The then divorced-spouse commenced an action in the
677, 685-86 (1995).
47 See I-6A MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6A.o2 (1997);
Armdap, Inc. v. Coast Bus. Sys., Inc., 188 E3d 512, 512 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) ("Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits only precludes the parties from
relitigating issues that were raised or could have been raised in that action.... [A] copyright
claim could not have been raised in the state action because the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising under the copyright statute.").
48 See Feist Pub'ns, 499 U.S. at 361 (1991).
49 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, Civ. A. No. 95-2862, 1996 WL I093O9, at *2-3 (E.D. La.
1996).
50 California has a sui generis statutory law of community property. See BASSETT, supra
note 17, § 1:4.
51 In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). During the mar-
riage, the husband wrote and published several books, including two books on trivia: The
Complete Unabridged Super Trivia Encyclopedia (1977) and The Complete Super Trivia
Encyclopedia, Volume II (i9 8i). Id.
52 Id.
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California state court seeking an order for one-half of the proceeds, if any,
from what ultimately was an unsuccessful copyright infringement action.
53
The Worth court was then asked to reconcile California's community
property law, which dictates that all property acquired during a marriage is
community property, with § 201(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, which "vests
initial[]" ownership of the copyright in the individual author(s).5 4 California's
community property law is based on a well-established partnership model
in which each spouse makes a contribution to the marriage and shares alike
in the wealth or assets accumulated during the term of the marriage.
55
Copyright law on the other hand reflects a constitutional and statutory policy
determination that if authors are granted a limited period of exclusivity to
exploit the market for the copyrighted work, this economic incentive will
promote the progress of science and the useful arts by encouraging authors
to be more productive and to disseminate their works to the public.
56
The Worth court relied on the terms of the prior stipulated judgment that
the divorced-spouse would be entitled to one-half of the copyright royalties
to conclude that the author-spouse also conceded that the copyrights were
community property.5 7 The Worth court apparently conflated ownership of
the tangible embodiment of the work with the ownership of the intangible
copyright by holding that "[i]f the artistic work is community property,
then it must follow that the copyright itself obtains the same status."5 8
The Worth court then concluded that both the copyrights and the tangible
benefits that flow from the copyright are community property s9
The Worth court without analysis considered the "vests initially"
provision of § 201(a) in pari materia with § 201(d)(1), which provides
that copyrights may pass by operation of law without considering either
explicitly or implicitly the § 201(e) limitation that any initial transfer of
a copyright from the author must be voluntary, and then concluded that
California's community property laws, simultaneously with the Copyright
53 Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 Fzd 569,570-71,574 (9th Cir. 1987); Marriage of
Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 135 & n.I.
54 See Martiage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37, 139.
55 Id. at 137.
56 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984) ("[The limited monopoly conferred by the Copyright Act] is in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period
of exclusive control has expired.").
57 Marriage of Worth, Z4t Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. Perhaps, a better interpretation is that the
stipulated judgment represented fair economic terms on which to end a marriage rather than
an acknowledgement of ownership of the property within the marriage.
s8 Id. at 137.
59 Id. at 138.
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Act vesting the author-spouse with the copyright, transferred an interest in
the copyright to the non-author spouse through the marital community.6°
Having concluded that federal law possibly permitted the transfer of a
copyright from the vested-author to the community property estate, the
Worth court then considered whether an author's incorporeal copyright was
the type of intangible property that could be assigned through community
property law.6 1 Some intangible assets such as a professional license are
excluded in allocating community property because community property
only exists prior to the dissolution of the marriage.6 The Worth court strived
to distinguish a professional license to practice law, medicine, or a skilled-
trade acquired during marriage from a copyright to a work created during
the marriage by holding that "[a] copyright has a present value based upon
the ascertainable value of the underlying artistic work. Its value normally
would not depend on the postmarital efforts of the authoring spouse but
rather on the tangible benefits directly or indirectly associated with the
literary product. '63
This last bare assumption by the court regarding the ease of valuing a
copyright and the lack of a need to cultivate a copyright's long term asset
yalue is without citation and does not appear to comport with common
sense or common business practices.' This mistaken assumption regarding
copyright valuation is inconsistent with the facts in the Worth case itself.
The issue in the Worth case was, if, the value of a copyright were to change
because of a court judgment in a post-dissolution copyright infringement
action, would the non-author spouse be entitled to a share of that judgment.
In Worth, because of alleged copyright infringing acts by a third-party
post-dissolution, the parties were now looking to a. state court to allocate
economic rights that may accrue only should the author-spouse eventually
prevail in a federal court copyright infringement action.6"
6o See Rodrigue 1, 55 F. Supp. zd 534, 537 n.z (E.D. La. 1999) ("The only reported case
[Marriage of Worth] on the subject concluded, with little analysis, that the Copyright Act does
not preempt community property law."); Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
61 Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
6z Id.
63 Id.
64 See In re Marriage of Heinze, 631 N.E.2d 728, 732 (III. App. Ct. 1994) (valuing post-
dissolution efforts of a spouse to promote books); 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY § 23.07 [i], at 23-121I (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012) (discussing the valuation of
intellectual property rights); cf. Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 116o (Mass.
1985) (finding present value of future income too speculative to consider).
65 Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39; see also Rodrigue I, 2 18 F3d 432, 434 (5th
Cir. 2000). Further, because of the length of the copyright term, life of the author plus fifty
years (now seventy years, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 3o--o5(zo6)), there is an immense potential for
new uses and new markets that were not considered at the time of the divorce. Cf Boosey &
Hawkes Music Publrs, Ltd, v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that
the 194o movie Fantasia when re-released in home-video format (between I991 and 1998)
grossed more than $360 million).
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State-law-based claims to income derived from licensing a copyright
have been raised in other family law contexts such as whether copyright
income should be considered in calculating child support. In Boutz v.
Donaldson, an author-spouse contended that the Copyright Act precluded
a state court from considering the author's income from copyrighted works
as income for the purposes of determining child support.66 The author-
spouse erroneously contended that because copyrights are initially vested
in the author under 17 U.S.C. § 201, copyrights are exclusively governed
by 17 U.S.C. § 301 rather than by the common law or statutes of any state;
and because 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) precludes a state from seizing a copyright,
states are preempted from considering copyright income as an element in
determining child-support obligations.
67
The Donaldson court relied on Worth and held that income from the
exploitation of a copyrighted work may be considered in determining the
amount of a child support award.6' The Donaldson court's holding is less
intrusive to the copyright rights of the author-spouse than the holding in
Worth. The Donaldson court merely permitted the lower court to consider
the royalty income, if any, as a factor in determining child support, while
the Worth court shared the ownership of the copyright itself.69 Remember
that § 201(e) expressly prohibits only involuntary transfers of a copyright;
here, while not dispositive, the author-spouse had previously "consented
in [the] original marital settlement agreement to include ...copyright
income for purposes of child support[.]"70 In Donaldson, the copyright
income was a result of a voluntary transfer of the copyright. The author-
spouse's specious contention in Donaldson taken to its logical extreme
would prohibit states from considering income derived from a copyright
for state income tax purposes. Also, this contention would immediately fail
in the context of the Internal Revenue Code, as Congress has expressed a
clear and unambiguous statutory intent to tax copyright revenues.7
C. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue
Twelve years after Worth in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, a federal court
was first called upon to interpret copyright ownership in light of state
community property law and to reconcile the obvious conflict between
66 Boutz v. Donaldson, 991 P.2d 517, 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 525.
69 Donaldson pre-dated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ro-
drigue. Rodrigue 1, 2 18 E3d 4 3 2; Donaldson, 991 P.2d 517.
70 Donaldson, 991 P.zd at 524.
71 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property
Taxation, 76 BRooK. L. REV. I, 18--21 (2010).
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federal copyright law and state community property law.7" The district
court was unable to harmonize the blatant conflict between Louisiana's
state community property law and federal copyright law and held that the
state law purporting to transfer a copyright was preempted.73 However, by
unbundling and shuffling the bundle of sticks that comprised the author's
copyright, the court of appeals was able to achieve some measure of
harmonization between state and federal law and found that there was no
federal preemption.7 4
1. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue I (U.S. District Court).-The district court in
Rodrigue v. Rodrigue I started with the basic proposition that when divorce
terminates the marriage, property belonging to the couple is subject
to Louisiana's laws governing co-ownership. 5 The non-author spouse
contended that, by operation. of Louisiana community property law,
§ 201(d) of the Copyright Act made her a co-owner of the author-spouse's
copyrights that subsisted during the marriage.7 6 The non-author spouse
further asserted a claim for an accounting for the use of copyrighted images
that were created during the marriage in any new derivative works painted
after the dissolution of the marriage." If the copyright to these original
works properly vested in the couple as community property, then any
subsequent re-use of the copyrighted images should result in a royalty
payment to the non-author spouse as a co-owner of the copyright to the
original work.7 8
Louisiana law provides that until the community property is partitioned,
"[e]ach spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in former community
property and its fruits and products[.]"79 The author-spouse unnecessarily
conceded before the district court that the divorced-spouse was entitled
to an accounting for artworks created during the marriage; however, the
author-spouse maintained that the divorced-spouse had no right to
royalties from use of the reoccurring images in subsequent post-divorce-
72 See Rodigue 1, 55 F Supp. 2d 534, 540 (E.D. La. 1999) (finding federal preemption
of Louisiana community property law), rev'd, 218 F3d 432, 440 (5 th Cir. 2000) (straining to
construe Louisiana community property law as consistent with the Copyright Act). The Ro-
drigues commenced their action in federal court as a declaratory judgment to adjudicate the
disputed ownership of the copyright to works created by George Rodrigue during the mar-
riage. Rodrigue 11, 218 F3d at 434.
73 Rodnigue I, 55 F Supp. 2d at 547.
74 Rodnigue 1, 218 E 3 d at 434-42.
75 Id. at 433-34.
76 Id. at 434.
77 Rodtiguel, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 536 n. I (referencing specifically the "Blue Dog" and "Jolie
Blonde" images).
78 Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, Civ. A No. 95-2862, 1996 WL 1093o9, at *' (E.D. La. March
13, 1996).
79 Rodrigue 11, 2 18 F3 d at 434 (quoting LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2369.2 (20 10)).
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partitioned artworks.8" The author-spouse disputed the divorced-spouse's
claim to a percentage of the value of the post-dissolution artworks and
contended that federal law vests the copyright solely in the author of the
work and that there was no subsequent transfer of the copyright to the
spouse or the marital community because Louisiana law does not authorize
such a transfer.8 Additionally, any state law purporting to make such an
involuntary transfer was preempted under § 201(e).82
In a cogent opinion with exhaustive citation to persuasive authority, the
district court concluded that any attempt to transfer the author-spouse's
copyright to the other spouse by an operation of state law was preempted
either under § 201(e) or under the general copyright preemption provision
§ 301(a).83 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that there was
a conflict between state and federal law, but characterized the conflict as
merely a "facial" conflict.84 Because the appeals court generally accepted
the district court's factual and legal analysis while rejecting its ultimate
conclusion that the conflict needed to be resolved by congressional action,
this article will not further discuss the district court's sound analysis.85
2. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue II (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).-The
judgment of the district court in Rodigue I was reversed on other grounds.86
Through a myopic textual analysis of the Copyright Act, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit engaged in a Solomon-like maneuver
to avoid finding more than a facial conflict between state and federal law.87
Because Rodrigue H1 is a federal court decision, this section will extensively
discuss some of the many failings of the court's opinion in harmonizing
the conflict between federal and state law as well as its weaknesses as a
precedent under copyright right and domestic relations law.
80 Rodriguel, 55 E Supp. 2d at 536.
81 Id. at536-37.
82 Id. at 543.
83 Id. at 540-43.
84 Rodrigue II, zi8 F3d at 435.
85 Id. at 434.
86 See id. at 442 ("In the end, we disagree with the district court only to the extent that
it held the conflict between Louisiana community property law and federal copyright law ir-
reconcilable absent congressional intercession.").
87 Id. at 435-42; Dane S. Ciolino, How Copyrights Became Community Property (Sort of):
Through the Rodrigue v. Rodrigue Looking Glass, 47 Lov. L. REv. 631, 632 (2001) (describing
the court as "constructing a curious new regime[,]" which was a resolution that neither party
argued in the briefs before the court of appeals); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., To Split or Not to Split:
Judicial Divisibility of the Copyright Interests of Authors and Others, 40 FAM. L.Q. 499, 517 (2oo6)
(depicting the Rodrigue appeals court as "boldly innovative and diabolically clever[]").
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a. Copyright Ownership (17 U.S.C. § 201(a))
First, the Rodrigue II court interpreted the text of § 201 (a) quite literally,
reading it to convey only the exclusive right to the § 106 copyright without
vesting the corresponding economic rights in the author.' Under this
interpretation, only the § 106 exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation,
publication, public performance, and public display were initially vested
in the author.8 9 Ignoring a long line of United States Supreme Court
precedent, the Rodiigue II court then carefully noted that § 201; does not
use the term "owner" or "ownership" nor does it refer to the concomitant
economic rights of copyright ownership. 90 Moreover, § 201(a) describes
the status of joint authors as coowners of the copyright. So, this is a very
strained interpretation of § 201(a). 91 Although citing Worth on the issue of
the copyright vesting in the author, the Rodrigue H court then sub silencio
rejected the Worth court's holding (or at least its legal analysis) and found
that the author-spouse was the sole author and the other spouse was not a
co-author under copyright law.92
b. Voluntary Initial Transfer (17 U.S.C. §201(e))
Second, like the Worth court, the Rodrigue II court failed to address the
pink elephant in the room by answering the question of whether there
was an initial voluntary transfer under § 201(e).93 Hypothetically, had the
88 Rodrigue II, 218 E3d at 435-36. These property law principles may be sui generis to
Louisiana as a civil code jurisdiction and severely limit Rodnigue H as persuasive authority in
the Fifth Circuit, much less nationally. See Nevins, Jr., supra note 87, at 517-18.
89 Rodrigue 11, 2 18 F3d at 435-36.
90 Id.; see also Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1998);
Harper & Row, Publ'rs, v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,546 (1985) ("Section 1o6 of the Copy-
right Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright."); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,432-33 (1984) (characterizing the author as "owner"
of § 1o6 rights); cf. 17 U.S.C. § io9(a) (2oo6) (describing the holder of § io6 rights as a copy-
right owner via the first sale doctrine). It seems a bit incongruous that the Copyright Act
§ 201 vests something less than ownership in the author but the author has the ability to grant
a greater estate that comprises all the attributes of ownership, including economic rights. This
violates the ancient doctrine of nemo doat qui non habet (no one may transfer more than he
owns). Compare § io6, with § 20 1(a).
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2oo6) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests ini-
tiaily in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.") (emphasis added).
92 Rodrigue II, 218 F3 d at 436 n.16.But see id. at 438 n.26.
93 There is only one citation to § 201(e) in the appellate opinion but no analysis of
whether there was a voluntary transfer of the copyright to the marital estate. See ido. at 441 n.47;
cf Rodriguel, 5 F. Supp. zd 534,542-44 (E.D. La. 1996) (analyzing the application of§ 2ol(e)
in great detail). This issue was raised in the appellate briefs. See Joint Brief for Appellees at
31-43,Rodrigue I, 218 F3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30334). A charitable commentator may
read into the court's silence that since Louisiana law explicitly permits married couples to opt
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Rodrigue H court interpreted § 20 1(e) so that there was a voluntary transfer
of the copyright, then the logical result of Congress trying to protect dissent
authors by shielding their copyrights from confiscation by the totalitarian
government of the USSR was that Congress permitted the authors to
retain control of the work's dissemination, but the copyright royalties, if
any, would belong to the USSR under the § 201 transfer by law provision.
This author speculates that even the Rodrigue I court would agree that
this would be an absurd result. While Rodrigue II's holding is arguably
consistent with an allocation of community property under Louisiana law,'
it is unlikely that the Fifth Circuit would have reached the same result or
even applied Rodrigue H as precedent had the government of the USSR
appeared seeking its share of the royalties from the exploitation of the
copyrights of dissent Soviet authors.
Dodging the clear preemption question presented by § 201(e),9 s the
Rodngue 11 court then developed a novel and un-briefed theory of the case
which used principles of Louisiana property law originally derived from
Roman law and divided the author's copyright into functional property
rights such as the "(1) usus-the right to use or possess," "(2) abusus-the
right to abuse or alienate," and "(3)fructus-the right to the fruits . "...'96
Under the court's analysis, the author-spouse retained the § 106 copyright
grant of exclusive rights, including the rights of usus and abusus, while the
fructus of the copyright was owned either jointly by the spouses or by the
marital estate as a separate entity.97 The court then lumped intangible
registered and unregistered federal copyrights into the Louisiana state
property law category of "registered movables."' Under Louisiana law, if
a good is "moveable," only one spouse has the right of use or alienation of
it, but the marital community has the right to the profits arising from the
use of property. 9
into one of two property regimes either community property or separate with the community
property regime being the default option that there was perhaps a colorable argument of vol-
untary choice. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2328-2329 (zo io).
94 Butsee, Ciolino, supra note 87, at 638 n.36.
95 SeeRodriguel, 55 E Supp. 2d at 542-44.
96 Rodngue 11, zi8 F3d at 437, 438. However, deciding an appeal sua sponte on grounds
that were not briefed by the parties appears to be contrary to normal appellate court practice.
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. io6, 120 (1976) ("It is the general rule, of course, that a federal
appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below."); Ciolino, supra note 87,
at 632 (commenting that this issue was neither briefed by the parties nor considered by the
district court below).
97 Rodrigue 11, 218 F3d at 437.
98 See id. at 438.
99 Id. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Everything Is Bigger in Texas, Except the Community
Property Estate: Must Texas Remain a Divorce Haven for the Rich?, 44 FAM. L.Q. 293 (2010) (com-
paring community property laws).
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c. Erie doctrine
Third, the Fifth Circuit's procrustean use of Louisiana civil law to
dismember the author's copyright may have run afoul of the Erie doctrine. 1°°
Under Erie, federal courts are to look to the, statutes and decisional law of
the states to decide state law issues. 01 Without citation to either legislative
or judicial Louisiana state authority, the Rodrigue II court introduced a
new and peculiar concept into Louisiana law: each spouse would get less
than unconditional co-ownership of community property010 The Rodrigue
II court, while glomming on to selected black letter law provisions of the
Louisiana statutes, did not consider these provisions as understood in the
larger civil law tradition nor did it attempt to anticipate how the Louisiana
Supreme Court would resolve these issues. Instead, the Rodrigue H court
cited to a handful of black letter law cases on the trifold nature of property
under Louisiana law: usus, abusus, andfructus. Yet the court did not appear to
understand or appreciate the fundamental nature Of each of these property
rights. These rights are not severable. Louisiana community property law
would vest full co-ownership in both spouses.10 3
Another example of the court's wayward reasoning is the court's use
of the term fructus in the copyright context. The nature of the fruits of a
property right in Louisiana is much narrower than the use of the term by
the Rodrigue II court. The issue in Rodrigue II was the right to royalties or
payment for derivative works based on copyrighted Works created during
the marriage. Under the holding in Rodrique II, the author-spouse retained
the rights of usus and abusus while the court partitioned thefructus. However,
as a practical matter, the non-artist spouse's potential to accumulate wealth
based on a claim to the fructus as an economic right is potentially very
limited because under Louisiana law a transfer of an exclusive right that
constitutes copyright ownership is not a fruit of the author's copyright.
Rather, a copyright transfer is more properly characterized as a product of
the author's copyright because afructus is a transfer such as a non-exclusive
license that does not significantly diminish the remaining substance of the
underlying copyright.1°4 Once an exclusive right that the author possesses
under copyright law is transferred, it is a right that the author no longer
ioo See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
101 See Ciolino, supra note 87, at 638 n.36 ("It is uncertain whether the [Rodrigue /] court
was confused about the effect of Louisiana property law in this regard, or simply decided to
ignore the law as written and write its own Louisiana marital-property law.").
1OZ Id. at 639.
103 See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2336, 2338 (2010); Ciolino, supra note 87, at 638 n.36.
104 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 551 (2010); see Ciolino, supra note 87, at 654-55. The state-
ment could be qualified if one considers the termination of transfer rights but, these rights
were not explicitly addressed by the court. If one considers the right to terminate the transfer
then perhaps the transfer may become a fruit.
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possesses unless or until the author or the author's statutory heirs exercise
the author's right to terminate the transfer.1"5 So, the revenue from a sale or
transfer of the copyright would belong to the author-spouse under a correct
interpretation of Louisiana law.1"
As one commentator concluded:.
Ironically, the [Rodrigue II] court also failed as a matter of state
community property law. By vesting only the copyright fructus
in the community without the usuis and abusus, the court denied
the community the bulk of the economic benefits generated by
copyrights-namely, economic benefits flowing from copyright
use (usus) and transfer (abusus). Of course, the court easily could
have captured these economic benefits for the community
simply by declaring all copyrights to be co-owned community
property with exclusive management authority in the author-
spouse. Nevertheless, it chose not to do so. By fracturing
ownership and allocating the dismembered parts the way it did,
the court took away much of what it had hoped to give the non-
author spouse. 107
Of course, if the Rodrigue H court declared that all of the Copyright
Act's § 106 rights were community property, then its myopic interpretation
of § 201's vesting provision, as solely vesting exclusive copyright's property
rights in the author but not the economic benefit of those rights, would fail.
d. Registered Movables
Fourth, another apparent misunderstanding by the Rodrigue II court
is whether copyrights are "registered movables" under Louisiana law.1"8
While the Rodrigue II court is correct that as a matter of the efficient
administration of the copyright estate, the economic management
and control of the copyright should remain in the hands of the author-
spouse;"°9 however, the Rodrigue 11 court erred when it held that copyrights
are "registered movables." "0 "Under Louisiana law, a 'registered movable'
is one 'for which the registration scheme provided by law is one that
purports to protect those who rely on the ownership inferences that come
from registration or issuance in one's name.'11 1l There is no requirement to
105 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); Ciolino, supra note 87, at 654-55.
io6 Ciolino, supra note 87, at 655.
107 Id. at 662-63.
1o8 Ciolino, supra note 87, at 645-46.
IO9 Rodrigue II, 2 18 F3d 432, 435, 438 (5th Cir. 2000).
iio Ciolino, supra note 87, at 646. Traditional examples of registered movables include
motor vehicles, stocks, bonds, and negotiable instruments. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICIARD
D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 5.7, in LouISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 2007); see
also LA. CIv. CODE.ANN..art. 2351 cmt. b (2009).
I II Ciolino, supra note 87, at 646 (quoting KATHERINE S. SPAHT & LEE HARGRAVE,
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 5.7, at 241, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1997)). See also
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register a copyright, and the vast majority of copyrights are never registered.
Although federal copyright registration conveys significant benefits, under
the 1976 Copyright Act federal registration is still optional.' Federal
copyrights are not necessarily registered movables under Louisiana law,
but because the Fifth Circuit nonchalantly categorized them as such and
assumed that Louisiana's domestic relations law governed the ownership
of the copyright, each spouse-not just the author-spouse-has the right
to manage or alienate the copyright for unregistered copyrighted works." 3
This point is more than speculative because many of the disputed works
before the court in Rodrigue were unregistered copyrighted works.1
e. Derivative Works (17 U.S.C. § 106(2))
Fifth, as a matter of sound copyright law and policy, it was erroneous
for the Rodigue H court to hold that if the author-spouse creates any new
derivative works based on original works that were created during the
marriage, the author-spouse must share the revenue from them."' Under
copyright law, the artist will always be free to create new interpretations
of the original without paying royalties to the divorced-spouse. However,
should the artist copy original expression from a work made during the
marriage, this new work would be a derivative work. Under the holding
in Rodrigue II, the divorced-spouse would then be entitled to a share of
the proceeds from any economic exploitation of the new post-divorce
derivative work.'1 6
As "copyrights do not protect thematic concepts, the fact that the same
subject matter may be present in two paintings does not prove copying or
infringement."1 7 However, applying the copyright law prohibitions against
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2351 (2009) ("A spouse has the exclusive right to manage, alienate,
encumber, or lease movables issued or registered in his name as provided by law.").
112 Johnson v. Jones, 149 F3d 494,505 (6th Cir. 1998); see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Much-
nick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) ("[ 7 U.S.C.§ 41 i(a)] requires copyright holders to register
their works before suing for copyright infringement .... [and] is a precondition to filing a claim
that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.").
113 See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2009) ("Each spouse acting alone may manage,
control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law.").
114 Rodrigue l,55 E Supp. 2d 534,536,,546 n. 15 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Civil Code article 235I
provides: 'A spouse has the exclusive right to alienate, manage, encumber, or lease movables
issued or registered in his name as provided by law.' Article 2351 would address the problem
only when the author spouse has registered a copyright pursuant to § 410 of the Act. Equal
management rules would still apply to unregistered copyrights.") (citations omitted).
i 15 Rodigue 11, 218 F3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2ooo).
116 Rodrigue 11, 218 E3d at 437, 439, 442; see Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art
Exch., 575 F2d 62,63 (3d Cir, 1978).
117 Franklin Mint, 575 E2d at 65.
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unauthorized derivative works in the context of thematic works is tricky."18
As the Third Circuit found, "the line between copying and appropriation is
often blurred.""' 9 In the case of artists who continuously paint new works
on. the same theme, it may be extremely difficult to separate works that
intentionally or subconsciously copy prior works from new original works
that merely share a common theme and artistic style.' z '.
Perhaps the most famous example of a thematic artist is Claude Monet
who painted numerous painting of the water lilies in his garden over a
period of.about thirty years.' In Rodrigue, the'artist created a signature
image based on the family pet, a dog named Tiffany.'zUnder copyright law,
in the case of thematic artists such as Rodrigue who repeatedly return to
the same artistic subject, the act of determining Whether a new work is also
derivative work requires a delicate factual and legal analysis. There must be
an extraordinarily nuanced determination of both originality and potential
copying among every one of the artist's subsequent works that shares a
similar visual appeal and theme with prior works and is also executed in
the same artistic manner.'23 This subtle determination will have to be made,
anew each time the artist creates a new work and the non-author spouse
claims economic rights derived from the new work.
f. Miscellaneous Copyright Law Interpretation Errors
Sixth, the Rodrigue I court also gave short shrift to the. other arguably
meritorious contentions of the author-spouse. The Rodrigue Hf court
avoided the thorny issue of title and co-ownership created by the Worth
court by recognizing the Congress vested title to the copyright in the
author-spouse.2 4 The Rodrigue H court rejected the author-spouse's
second contention that subjecting economic rights of an author-spouse
to different state domestic relations laws will damage the federal policy
of predictability and uniformity in copyright law.' s As support for this
proposition, the Rodrigue H court looked to other provisions of the Copyright
Ix8 Id.
I 9 Id.
120 Ciolino, supra note 87, at 650 & n.97.
121 See THE NEW YORK TIMES, "11E NEW YORK TIMES GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE:
A DESK REFERENCE FOR THE CURIOUS MIND 33 (3d ed. 201 i) (providing examples of Monet's
thematic collections, including the "Rouen Cathedral 0892-94), haystacks (189o-91), and
water lilies (painted over 30 years beginning in 1899)[]")); JEAN-DoMINIQUE REY & DENIS
ROUART, MONET WATER LILIES: ThE COMPLETE SERIES 124 (2OO8).
122 Id. at 433; Ishaq Kundawala, Note, Rodrigue v. Rodrigue: The Fifth Cir uit Aligns with
Worth-Accepting Copyright as Community Property, 3 ThL. 3. TEcH. & INTEL, PROP. 165, t65
(2001).
123 Ciolino, supra note 87, at 65o.
124 Rodrigue H, 218 F.3d at44.
125 Id.
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Act where Congress had specifically allowed state law to govern or where
Congress was silent, thus permitting state law to operate by default (as long
as state law was consistent with the federal purpose of copyright law)) 6
A further problem with Rodrigue H's analysis is its observation that
copyrights are conveyed by "individual, non-uniform state contract laws[.]"
"27 However, as a practical matter, state contract law is remarkably uniform. I2 8
The Copyright Act contains federal limitations on state contract law. The
Copyright Act further provides a minimal level of contractual formalities
such as a signed writing.2 9 Also, the federal courts have consistently
intervened and created federal common law to assure that state contract
law is congruent with federal copyright policies.' 30 So, state law could
not deviate too far from national contract norms. Further contributing to
uniformity, while state law requires consideration as an element of a valid
contract, federal copyright law is prepared to validate contracts without
consideration. 131
The non-uniform state law contract analogy used by the Rodrigue II
court does not withstand a careful analysis. Although contract law among
the states is relatively stable and consistent, domestic relations laws
that govern the allocation of pyoperty vary greatly among the common
law equitable jurisdiction states and the community property states-
even within the eight community property states, there are significant
differences.13 While the appeals court in Rodrigue H faced the simple
problem of applying the law of one state to allocate property interests in
126 Id.
127 ld.
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTRODUCTION 2 (1981); Gregory E.
Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract
Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 510-13,517 (1998).
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-57 (9th Cir. 199o).
130 See, e.g., Cincom Sys., v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431,436 (6th Cit. 2009) ("IW)hen in-
terpreting intellectual property licenses[,] .... [fiederal common law governs 'questions with
respect to the assignability of a patent [or copyright] license."'); Saturday Evening Post Co. v.
Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 8 16 F2d 1191, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing whether a clause
in a contract prohibiting the licensee to contest the validity of the copyright was enforceable
under federal common law); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 689 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)
("The rights of the patent owner to license the use of his invention is a creature of federal
common law as is the right of the licensee to have the license construed."). Further, federal
common law rather than state law governs conflict of law rules. See Itar-Tass Russian News
Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 E3d 82, 90 (2d Cit. 1998) (developing federal common law
to decide a conflicts of law issue in a copyright case, where the Copyright Act does not contain
a controlling provision).
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (2006).
132 Kenneth W. Kingma, Property Division at Divorce or Death for Married Couples Migrat-
ing Between Common Law and Community Property States, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 74, 76 &
n.19 (2009) (for an excellent table summarizing the differences, see id. at 93 (App. A)); James
R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: Equitable Doesn't
Equal Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21, 21-24 (201).
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copyrights, in an increasingly mobile society, more courts will likely be
faced with the tormenting problem of having to decipher multiple different
state laws to allocate rights in copyrights that accrued in different states at
different points in time. 33"[Tjhe law of the state where a married couple
is domiciled at the time property is acquired also determines the division
of that property upon divorce."'' Consequently, the allocation of interests
in copyrights under state law of a peripatetic married couple at the time of
divorce will not only frustrate the divorce court but also Congress's goal for
a national uniform copyright law.
As support for its decision to include thefructus of the copyright as part
of the marital estate, the Rodrigue H court noted that Congress permitted
state law to govern the disposition of copyrights as part of testamentary
or intestate succession. 35 Unlike the issues before the Rodrigue court
where there is no record of Congress considering the role of state domestic
relations law in the allocation of copyrights, Congress explicitly considered
whether to create a federal testamentary and intestate succession scheme
in the Copyright Act and elected to defer to state law.13 6 However,
pragmatism, not deference to the unique role of the state law in the area
of trusts and estates, was a driving force behind this occasion of deference;
whatever copyright incentives Congress intended to grant to the author to
promote the progress of science or the useful arts, those incentives cease to
serve their purpose upon the death of the author. Further, by allocating the
posthumous termination of transfer rights, Congress protected the interests
of those specific types of beneficiaries it chose to favor rather than permitting
states to choose which types of beneficiaries to privilege under state laws
of intestate succession or state domestic relations law. The 1976 Copyright
Act was not passed in haste. Congress received reports, held hearings, and
debated what ultimately became the 1976 Copyright Act over a period
of about twenty-years.'37 The 1976 Copyright Act as a whole represents.
a comprehensive negotiated legislative regime that balances the rights of
the public to have access to and to use copyrighted works, the incentive
rights of authors to control the use of and to profit from the work, and the
rights of others that Congress elected to benefit through provisions of the
Copyright Act. Therefore the Rodrigue H court erroneously drew the wrong
133 See In re Estate of Kessler, 203 N.E.2d 22 1, 222-23 (Ohio 1964); Kingma, supra note
132, at 81-83.
134 Kingma, supra note 13z, at 83.
135 Rodriguell, 218 F3d 43 2, 4 4 1 (5th Cir. 2000).
136 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, § 5.1.5, 5:19 n.68 (Supp. 2007). Although industry rep-
resentatives lobbied for a federal copyright foreclosure scheme, Congress found that the ben-
efits from such a system would have limited application and would not justify creating such a
complex statutory and regulatory regime. Id.
137 See, e.g., Mark B. Radefeld, Note, The Medium is the Message: Copyright Law Confronts the
Information Age in New York Times v. Tasini, 36 AKRON L. REV. 545, 547 n. 11 (2003).
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conclusion from Congress's permitting state testamentary and intestate
succession laws to govern the transfer of a deceased author's present, but
not future, interest in a copyright. Rather the better interpretation of this
instance of Congressional acquiescence to state testamentary and intestate
succession law is that it is merely a narrow exception to Congress's general
intent to displace state laws in the area of copyright. In sum, the court's
reliance on Congress's deference to states in the limited area of intestate
succession of copyrights is another example of its myopic reasoning.
g. Copyright Economic Incentives
Seventh, the Rodrigue II court was in error to second-guess Congress's
determination as to the quantitative importance of the Copyright Act's
economic incentives to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. The author-spouse contended that by creating a community
property entitlement, the author would have less incentive to create
new works or exploit existing works. In its opinion, the Rodrigue II
court did not contend with a long line of United States Supreme Court
precedent that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors .. . ."38 Rather, the Rodrigue H court held that there was still
enough incentive for the author-spouse to continue to exploit existing
works or create new ones even after the division of the copyright's property
rights according to Louisiana law:
[W]e decline to assume globally that the commercial and
economic interests of spouses during marriage are so at odds
that one spouse would be disinclined to create copyrightable
works merely because the economic benefits of his endeavors
would inure to the benefit of their community rather than to
his separate estate. As for a former spouse's lack of incentive
following divorce, we perceive the presence of the proverbial
stick and carrot. To mix metaphors, the carrot is the half-a-loaf
incentive of the author to exploit pre-divorce copyrights to
the best of his ability rather than shelve them and receive no
benefit whatsoever; the stick is exemplified by the provision of
the Louisiana Civil Code that specifies an affirmative duty "to
138 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 2 i9 (1954); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003) ("'By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."') (quoting Harper & Row, Publ'rs,
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 477 (1984) ("Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive
rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to create, and that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in Science and the useful Arts .... The monopoly created by
copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.") (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, I56 (1975).
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manage prudently" former community property that remains
under one spouse's exclusive control. Indeed, that article
imposes a higher duty on a spouse managingformer community
property than the Code otherwise imposes on that same spouse
during the marriage or on a third party co-owner who is not a
former spouse.3 9
Under the above understanding of carrots and sticks, the Rodrigue I
court took the liberty of halving the value of the copyright to the author,
thus decreasing the economic incentive to exploit the existing work or to
produce new derivative works."4 The economic incentive undergirding
copyright law aims to motivate the author-whether it is too much, too
little, or just right is a policy determination that is constitutionally vested in
Congress and not in the federal courts. 4' In Eldredv. Ashcroft, admittedly
a post-Rodrigue case, the United States Supreme Court deferred to a
Congressional determination that an increase in value of the copyright to
the author from 99.4% of a perpetual copyright term to 99.8% of perpetual
copyright term was a policy judgment best left to Congress. 14
h. Rights of Non-Author-Spouse as Beneficial Owner
Eighth, the Rodrigue I court failed to consider whether by dividing
the royalties to the copyright, it granted the non-author spouse an
independent right to sue for copyright infringement as a beneficial owner
of the copyright. ' 4 Granting standing to the non-author spouse to sue for
copyright infringement would be a severe limitation on the right of the
author-spouse to manage the copyrights and may affect the value of the
copyrighted works. Additionally, this result would "impede Congress's
paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and
certainty of copyright ownership."'"
i. New Quasi-Fiduciary Management Duty on Author-Spouse
Ninth and finally, the Rodrigue H court improperly imposed a new duty,
totally absent in copyright jurisprudence, on the author-spouse to manage
and to exploit the disputed works, notwithstanding that one of the rights of
139 RodriguelI, 218 F3d at 442 (footnotes omitted).
140 See id. at 442-43.
141 SeeEldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n.15.
142 Id. at 2o9 n.I6.
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 50i(b) (2oo6); Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.zd 18o, 183 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("JA] fiduciary relationship arose between the parties, and the assignor became a
beneficial owner of the copyright with standing to sue infringers should the assignee fail to
do so.") (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted); 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 36, § 21:4.
144 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989).
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copyright ownership is the right not to license or to use the work.145 Even
in the relationship between joint authors who are also co-owners, Congress
did not impose a duty to manage the copyright prudently; rather, Congress
merely imposed a duty of accounting for any profits or royalties from the
exploitation of the work."4
j. Summary
In sum, the Rodrigue H court had a myopic view of the mischief caused
by its simultaneous sui generis interpretation of and lack of deference
to Louisiana state law. Further, the Court did not fully comprehend
the implications that its holding. may have on federal copyright law and
policy. If state or other federal courts adopt the analysis of Rodrigue II, the
snowball effect could create perverse state-law-level copyright incentives
depending on where the author is domiciled, where the spouse chooses
to file for divorce, or the state divorce court's choice of which state's
substantive law to apply to disputed property. Fortunately, because the
opinion was tied very specifically to its interpretation of Louisiana law, it
may be weak precedent in future cases in other states.
D. Marital Rights in a Copyright Asset Created During Marriage
Having set the stage with a critical analysis of the seminal cases of Worth
and Rodrigue, this section will treat the broad question of whether state
community property laws (or other state laws allocating property rights at
the dissolution of a relationship) conflict with the ownership provisions of
the Copyright Act. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict
with either the Constitution or federal laws are preempted. 47 Federal
preemption analysis generally falls under the rubric of express preemption,
conflict preemption, or field preemption.'48 Although these three forms
of preemption are stated as categories, they are quite permeable and
indeterminate in practice and application.
145 See Rodrigue 11, 218 F3d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 2000).
146 SeeThomson v. Larson, 147 E3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
147 Historically, the Supreme Court has consistently held "that state regulation of intel-
lectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in
[federal] patent laws." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
For other examples, see Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. (376 U.S. 234 (1964)) and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. (376 U.S. 225 (1964)), where the Supreme Court held in
both cases (decided on the same day) that the Illinois unfair competition law was preempted
by federal patent laws.
148 Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
469 (1984); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 8o8
(1994); seealso Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 28o, 287 (1995).
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Congress may expressly preempt state laws via statute, 49 but despite
the absence of such an express statutory command, a court may still find
a state law preempted if it determines that the state law conflicts with
federal law or finds that Congress intended federal law to occupy the
field and to displace all state regulation.' 0 In the case of conflict or field
preemption, state law is preempted if it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law or if "[the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 5 ' If the putative conflict is an area that is historically committed
to the state regulation, then federal courts will not find state law preempted
unless "[it] was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress [to preempt
state regulation]." As a rule of statutory construction, if there is more than
one plausible interpretation of the statute, then courts should ordinarily
prefer the interpretation that avoids preemption.' 2
In the special case of a conflict between federal law and state family-
property law, the conflict must "do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial'
federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law
be overridden."'51 3 While the preemption test as articulated by the Court
is a high bar, especially when the conflict is between federal law and state
family-property law, it is by no means an insurmountable standard.'
5 4
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's rhetorically high standard of review
and statement of deference to state courts and state laws in domestic
relations matters, in almost all the recent community property cases that
the Court has considered, it has found that the challenged state laws were
preempted.'55 This history may suggests that in practice, the Court actually
gives little more than standard deference to state laws governing questions
of family property-law in its conflict preemption analyses.
1 6
149 E.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76-78 (2oo8).
15o Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
151 Id. at 373 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Altria, 555 U.S. at 77.
153 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
154 See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 582 ("[O]n at least four prior occasions this Court has
found it necessary to forestall such an injury to federal rights by state law based on community
property concepts."). Hisquierdo became the fifth such case, id. at 59t; Ridgway v. Ridgway,
454 U.S. 46, 54-55,60 (i981), the sixth case; and Egelhoff v. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S.
141, 151 (2001), the seventh case. Earlier Supreme Court cases also support this point. See,
e.g., Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1964); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655,66,
(1950). Butsee Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S.619, 636 (1987) (holding that Tennessee statute pursuant
to which veteran was ordered by state divorce court to pay child support from his veterans'
disability benefits was not preempted by federal law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,670 (1962).
155 See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff e. rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. '41 (2001).
156 See, e.g., id. at 156-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236
(I98I) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
Ciolino, supra note 87, at 636 & n.26.
20][2-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 Preemption.-Any action by a state defining
authorship, co-ownership, or allocating either the § 106 copyrights or the
economic rights of a copyright owner may conflict with the Copyright
and Patent Clause in the United States Constitution. Article I, section 8,
clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries[." '157 This grant of power appears to be a limited
grant of authority to Congress to vest the copyright in authors alone (and
not others such as spouses or employers).'58 "Author" is a term of art under
copyright law.159 The Constitution does not define the term "author" nor
has Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[a]s a general rule,
the author is ... the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression[.]' 160 Though courts have considered this interpretation of
the Copyright Clause, they have squarely avoided the issue of whether
Congress could vest authorship in some entity other than the natural
person who engaged in the creative work.16
157 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
158 See i-i NIMMER & NIMMER,supra note 33, § i.o6; PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, Supra note'36,
§ 3:19. The work-for-hire doctrine that vests the copyright to a work created by an employee
for the employer within the scope of that employee's employment in the employer as the legal
author is based on a series of legal fictions and tenuous assumptions by Congress. NIMMER
supra, § i.o6[C]; William Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption,
z8 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'v 237, 267 (198o). Accordingly, it is not clear that Congress may
constitutionally involuntarily transfer a copyright from an author, much less whether a state
court may do so pursuant to state family-property law. See id. However, a very narrow literal in-
terpretation of the work-for-hire doctrine may escape this purported constitutional infirmity.
See Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A possible textual handle may be
found in the words of section 201(b), ... which appear to require not only that the work be a
work for hire but that it have been preparedfor the employer .... ), abrogated on other grounds
by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,406, 409 (1990).
159 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Scrv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,346 (1991); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, I I I U.S. 53,57-58 (1884) ("An author in that sense is 'he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or litera-
ture."').
16o Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989); see Feist Publ'ns,
499 U.S. at 345. An author is "'to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker."' Feist
Pub'ns, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles, t I I U.S. at 58); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,
536 F2d 486,490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("Originality means that the work owes its creation
to the author .... ); 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 37, § 2.01 ("[B]ecause an author is
'the beginner ... or first mover of anything ... creator, originator,' it follows that a work is not
the product of an author unless the work is original.") (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
16I See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 Fad 500, 506-07 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1991); Scherr v. Uni-
versal Match Cotp., 417 F.zd 497, 502 (zd CiT. 1969) (Friendlj, 3., dissenting); Schmid Bros.
v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik KG., 589 F Supp. 497; 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The Constitution
in Article I, § 8, clause 8, authorizes grants to 'authors' and not to their employers. An author
may, of course, assign to her employer her rights to exploit the work. But an employer, to be
regarded as an 'author,' must presumably make some significant contribution to the work. The
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In Worth, the author-spouse claimed that because federal law vests the
copyright solely in the author and state community property laws provide
for an equal interest in the copyright, state law is in conflict with federal
law and thus preempted. 6 The Worth court rejected as constitutionally
mandated a limited definition of author as creator-originator, holding that
"[t]he term 'author,' within the constitutional text, may be construed to
include the author's spouse under the principles of co-ownership or
transferred ownership we have discussed." '163 While copyright law does not
clearly establish the full range of potential authorship, at a bare minimum
each individual purporting to be an author must contribute something
original to the work.'I 4 This may even be a constitutional requirement.1 65
More stringently, statutory copyright law "requires [an author to make]
more than a minimal creative or original contribution to the work." 166
By illustration, in the context of the creation of joint-works, courts have
rejected joint-authorship when the contribution of a putative joint-author
did not include original expression.' 67 Further, Congress has the limited
power to grant to authors a body of undefined exclusive rights for a period
of time.168 It is not as self-evident as the Worth court's succinct holding
intimates that either the constitutional or statutory use of the term "author"
(or even co-ownership) without more may be expanded to include a spouse
who makes no original contribution to the copyrighted work.169
In Rodrigue II, the court did not divide the non-economic attributes
of authorship or even the limited § 106 grant of exclusive copyrights.
Rather, the Fifth Circuit relied on a sui generis Louisiana state law to
convert a federally-created property right in the § 106 copyright to a
state law body of severable property rights. The Court then permitted
the author to retain ownership and management of the § 106 bundle of
exclusive rights while dividing under state law any economic rights to the
copyright's exploitation. 7 ° The constitutional grant of power to Congress
Constitution could hardly have contemplated that mere employment was enough.") (citation
omitted).
162 In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. i35, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 198 7).
163 Id. at 139 n.5.
164 See Feist Pub'ns, 499 U.S. at 346.
165 See id; Burrow-Giles, i i i U.S. at 57-58; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § i.o6.
166 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting a higher origi-
nality standard for authorship as opposed to that required for copyright to merely subsist).
167 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,507 (2d Cir. 1991). Butsee Gaiman v. McFarlane,
360 E3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The decisions that say, rightly in the generality of cases,
that each contributor to a joint work must make a contribution that if it stood alone would
be copyrightable weren't thinking of the case in which it couldn't stand alone because of the
nature of the particular creative process that had produced it.").
I68 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 1.o5[A][I] & § i.o6[A].
169 See infra Part III.F.
170 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 6A.o5.
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to enact copyright laws presupposes that the economic rights would
accompany whatever limited copyright rights that Congress chose to grant
to authors."' A limited period of authorial copyright exclusivity without
the accompanying economic rights elevates form over substance and would
disserve the copyright's utilitarian incentive to the author to promote the
creation and the dissemination of knowledge.' An author's copyrights and
the associated economic rights are constitutionally (and statutorily) vested
in the author as an individual, and state laws that involuntarily transfer
them from the author are constitutionally suspect.7
2. Express Preemption (17 U.S.C. § 301).-Section 301 is the express
preemption section of the 1976 Copyright Act. Section 301 has two express
copyright preemption provisions: § 301(a) arid § 301(f). '4 Section 301(a) is
the general preemption provision of the Copyright Act precluding states
from granting rights that are the equivalent of § 106 copyrights in fixed
works of authorship. 7 Section 301(0 preempts state laws that grant rights
equivalent to those granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 (VARA). 76 This section will ultimately conclude that both
provisions of § 301 preempt state community property law.
a. Section 301(a) (17 U.S.C. § 106 Preemption)
Section 301(a) is a broad express preemption provision in the Copyright
Act. 7 7 Section 301(a) by its own terms displaces
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the'
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
171 Nevins, Jr., supra note 87, at 519.
172 See generally Steven Hetcher, Desire Without Hierarchy: The Behavioral Economics of
Copyright Incentives, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 817 (2010) (discussing the economic approach to
understanding incentives and creativity in copyright).
173 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 4o8 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("To have a property interest..
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. .... He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("[Plroperty under the due process clause is any interest to which a government has
given someone an entitlement.").
174 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2o06).
175 Id§ 301(a).
176 See infra Part III.D.2.b.
177 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) ("Establish-
ment of a federal rule of agency[] ... is particularly appropriate here given the Act's express
objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory
and common-law copyright regulation."); see also United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees
of the Univ. of Ala., 104 E3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he shadow actually cast by the
[Copyright] Act's preemption is notably broader than the wing of its protection.").
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matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103[] ....
[N]o person is entitled to any such-right or equivalent right in
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 7'
Section 301(b) provides a limited exception for state law-based rights
and remedies that are not within the subject matter of federal copyright
(as defined by § 102 and § 103) or that are not equivalent to the author's
rights under § 106.179 Unsurprisingly, § 301 presents the specter of federal
preemption of state laws allocating copyrights in marital dissolution
proceedings.
The Worth court gave short shrift to the author-spouse's contentions
that § 301(a) preempted California's community property laws that
allegedly transmuted copyright ownership from the author-spouse into
co-ownership with the non-author spouse.8 0 The Worth court found that
§ 301(a) only displaced state statutory and common law copyright laws and
that other state laws such as those relating to the ownership and division of
marital property were not preempted. 8' Yet two years later in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the United States Supreme Court would rely
on § 301(a)'s sweeping preemption of state laws and regulation to justify
rejecting individual state law definitions of "employee" and announcing
instead a federal common law definition derived from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency.8 " As construed by the courts, the sweep of § 301(a)
may be broader than its literal language.' The Worth court's analysis is
at best perfunctory, at worst merely conclusory, and in any case, without
significant bearing on copyright preemption analysis. Therefore, it does not
merit further discussion.
Section 301(a) conflict-preemption contentions did not fare better in
the appeal in Rodrigue II. The court did not completely analyze possible
conflicts between § 301(a) and Louisiana state community property law.'s4
For example, the court stated with approval that Louisiana law imposed an
obligation on the author-spouse to manage the fructus of the copyrighted
property prudently. s'8 This presupposes a duty to at least attempt to exploit
the copyrighted work, if not the more onerous burden of creating new
178 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
179 Id. §301(b).
18o See In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
18I Id. at 139-40.
182 Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740.
183 See Barndt v. County of L.A., 259 Cal. Rptr. 372,403-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("'An art-
ist does not work well under compulsion, and the court might find it difficult to pass judgment
upon the performance rendered."') (citation omitted).
184 See Rodgue 1, 55 E Supp. 2d 534, 540-41 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'don other grounds, 218
F3d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting § 301 (a) preemption).
185 Rodrigue 11, 218 F3d at 442-43.
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derivative works. 186 Yet, this state-imposed obligation may grant a right
that is in direct conflict with the author's rights under § 106. Section 106
includes the negative right not to publish, license or to otherwise exploit
the work187 and the positive right to choose when and how to introduce
the work to the public. 8 8 Further, any obligations that portend to force
an author to create new works raise serious First Amendment concerns
regarding compelled speech,89 as well as involuntary servitude concerns.90
b. Section 301(0 (17 U.S.C. § 106A Preemption)
Although Worth and Rodigue addressed the division of § 106 economic
rights with the non-author spouse, 9' courts have not yet considered an
author-spouse's limited moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act
(VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A.'9 "VARA was designed to protect the moral
rights of artists in their works. Moral rights protect an artist's interest in the
proper use of the artist's name and in maintaining the physical integrity of
the artist's work."' 9 3 The exercise of the § 106 economic rights, if conveyed
186 See Ciolino, supra note 87, at 632 ("Perhaps most surprisingly, a non-author spouse
now may be able to compel an author-spouse to, among other things, create and distribute
new works based on community copyrights if a 'prudent administrator' would do so."); Cf
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-t6
(1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.").
187 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,564 (1985) ("The
right of first publication encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also
the choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work."); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.; 189 E3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.
1999) (en banc) (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990)); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 Ezd 90, 99 (zd Cir. 1987).
188 Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
189 SeeWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[Tlhe right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
19o See, e.g., Barndt v. County of L.A., 259 Cal. Rptr. 372, 403-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
("An artist does not work well under compulsion, and the court might find it difficult to pass
judgment upon the performance rendered." (quoting 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964))); Cagle v. Hybner, No. M2oo6-o20 73-COA-R 3-CV, 2oo8 WL
2649643, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2008).
191 Rodrigue if, 218 F3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr.
135, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). The Worth case was decided in 1987, and VARA was not enacted
until 199o. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 199o, Pub. L. IoI-65o, Title VI, § 603(a), 104 Stat.
5128 (1990).
192 The copyrighted works in Worth (books) were not eligible for VARA protection. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a "work of visual art").The disputed paintings in the Rodrigue
line of cases appear to be VARA-protected works. See id.
193 Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 E Supp. 2d 1138, 1158 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (citing Berrios
Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F Supp. 2d 48, 50 (D.P.R. 2004)); see also Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 71 E3d 77, 81-83 (zd Cir. 1995). VARA protects only a "work of visual art," which
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through state community property law, may be inconsistent with the
exercise of the 'author's moral rights. Of note, the economic rights under
§ 106 are legally distinct from the moral rights (or VARA rights) under
§ 106A."9 The author of a work of visual art enjoys rights that are similar,
but not strictly equivalent, to the European or civil law concepts of moral
rights. 9 ' The author has the right of attribution and the right to prevent
the artist's name from being associated with a work that the artist did not
create."9 Under VARA, the author also possesses the right to prevent the
use of the author's name when the author's work is distorted or mutilated,
if use of the author's name would be prejudicial to the author's honor or
reputation. 197 Furthermore, the author also enjoys the right to prevent an
intentional distortion or mutilation of a work that would be prejudicial
to the author's honor or reputation as well as the right to "prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature, [or an] intentional or grossly
negligent destruction of that work .... ,198
Section 301(f)(1) preempts state laws that purport to grant legal rights
that are the equivalent of VARA.' 99 Any moral rights within the subject
matter of VARA are governed exclusively by VARA, and thus "no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any work of visual art under
is defined as
(i) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by
the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of 2oo or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author
and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single
copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer
that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6).
194 See Berrios Nogueras, 330 E Supp. 2d at 50.
195 See Carter, 71 F3d at 81-83 (discussing VARA rights and civil law counterparts);
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, VisualArtists Rights Act ("VARA ") and the Protection of Digital Works
of "Photographic" Art, 1 t N.C. J.L. & TECH. 531, 533 (oIo);see also H.R. REP. No. 1Ol-514, at
14-15 (I99O), reprinted in 199o U.S.C.C.A.N. 6924-25. VARA uses the term "author" rather
than artist so, following VARAs nomenclature, this article also uses author to describe works
created by individuals more often and accurately called artists in the vernacular.
196 17 U.S.C. § io6A(a) (2006). VARA excludes "(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart,
technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work,
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional,
descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container;.. . (B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6)
("Definitions").
197 17 U.S.C. § Io6A(a)(2); Berrios Nogueras, 330 F Supp. 2d at 5o .
198 § io6A(a)(3).
199 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(I) (2oo6); Chen v. Cayman Arts, Inc., No. io-80236-CIV, 2011 WL
782279, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
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the common law or statutes of any State."' ° Yet common law and statutory
remedies are not otherwise limited with respect to "activities violating legal
or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the rights conferred by
[VARA] with respect to works of visual art[.]" 20 ' VARA governs not only
an author's rights of attribution and integrity in the work"'2 but also the
transfer and waiver of those moral rights. 0 3.
VARA was not enacted until 1990, three years after the Court's decision
in In re Marriage of Worth. Moreover, even had the statute been in existence,
the copyrighted literary works in In re Marriage of Worth would not have
been eligible for protection as "works of visual art.''Z°4 Although VARA
was in existence at the time Rodngue was decided, one may only speculate
on the application of VARA to its facts, for the parties did not raise
§ 301(f) preemption, and the court. did not address the issue sua sponte
in its opinion. s05 Rodigue provides an interesting real world fact pattern
on which to examine the application of VARA and §, 301(f) preemption
in the intersection of state domestic relations law and federal copyright
law. The facts provided in the district court's opinion are consistent with a
determination that the author-spouse's paintings would have been VARA
protected works.z2  The federal court granted the non-author spouse an
equal share of the author's economic rights without addressing the question
of moral rights in the copyrighted works. 07 Further, the Rodrigue 11 court
in dicta, citing state law, instructed the author-spouse to manage the § 106
economic rights prudently.0 8One may infer that this instruction applied not
only to the economic rights relating to the works made during his marriage
but also to the economic rights to any subsequent post-divorce derivative
works.0 9 The highest and best use of a copyright for income maximization
200 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1).
201 § 301(f)(2).
202 17 U.S.C. § io6A(a).
203 § io6A(e).
204 Compare In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (copyright of a literary work),
with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "work of visual art" as a painting, drawing, print, sculp-
ture or photographic image and excluding books, magazines, newspapers, and periodicals).
205 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue 11), 218 F3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000); Original Brief
on Behalf of Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant, Veronica Hidalgo Rodrigue, Rodigue II,
218 E3d 432 (No. 99-30334), 1999 WL 33618615; Reply Brief on Behalf of Rodrigue, Rodrigue
11, 2 18 F3d 432 (No. 99-30334) 19 9 9 WL 33618616; Opposition of Defendant/Counterclaim-
ant-Appellant, Veronica Hidalgo Rodrigue to Petition for Rehearing en Banc, Rodrigue II, 218
F.3d 432 (No. 99-30334), 2000 WL 33991195.
2o6 See Rodrigue 1, 55 E Supp. 2d 534,536 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'don other grounds, Rodrigue
11, 218 F3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Kundawala, supra note 122, at 165-66. Compare
RodrigueL, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 536, with 17 U.S.C. § io (definition of a "work of visual art").
207 Rodigue 11, 218 F3d at 443.
2o8 Id.
209 Id. (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2o1o)). The Louisiana standard for evaluat-
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is not necessarily consistent with its highest and best use for maintaining
or promoting the artist's creative integrity. Further, short-term economic
uses of a work may benefit the divorced spouse but injure both the author's
longer-term development as an artist and longer-term economic interests.
While § 106 economic rights are defeasible, § 106A moral rights vest
solely in the author. °10 Unlike economic rights, moral rights may be waived
(in writing) but not transferred or assigned, even (arguendo) by operation of
state law. 1 The potential conflicts between the prudent profit-maximizing
exploitation of the economic rights and the moral rights of the author may
be made clearer using two examples. First, assuming that works with the
artist's name and signature are more valuable than works without them, the
§ 106 economic rights rationale under Rodrigue H would require the artist to
accept attribution and sign these works under some theory of the author's
duty to manage the copyright estate prudently. However, if for some reason
the artist thought that the work was flawed or otherwise was prejudicial
to the artist's reputation, under .§ 106A the author could decline to sign or
attribute the work."12 A prudent author may desire to sell or dispose of a
second rate or flawed work without placing her name on it. These works
would not have the same economic value as signed original works protected
under VARA. Thus; by placing the use and management of the work in
the hands of the author and overlaying the division of the interest in the
economic benefits of the copyright with a fiduciary-like duty imposed on
the author-manager-spouse, the non-author spouse's beneficial economic
interests may conflict with the author's free exercise of § 106A moral rights
that are by statute vested solely in the author.
As a second example, a prudent economic use of a flawed bronze statue
may be to sell it for its scrap metal value, just as a prudent use of another
artwork might be to permit it to be divided into smaller units for retail sale." 3
ing prudent management is not readily clear to one not trained in the civil law (such as the au-
thor), but it seems to be interpreted as a failure to act prudently "'in a manner consistent with
the mode of use of [the] property immediately prior to termination of the [inarriage]. [The
spouse] is answerable for any damage caused by his fault, default or neglect."' See Saacks v.
Saacks, 942 So. 2d 1130, 1136 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting art. 2369.3); Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Co-Ownership of Former Community Property: A Primer on the New Law, 56 LA. L. REv. 677, 698
& n. 149 (1996) ("The slight fault is that want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his
business."). See generally SPAHT & MORENO, supra note i1o, § 5.22.
210 17 U.S.C. § io6A(b).
211 See § io6A(e). The § io6A moral rights last for the life of the author. § io6A(d).
212 § io6A(a)(2).
213 Cf. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T Co., 856 F.zd 1341, 1342 (9th Cir.
t988) (destroying a book in order to mount images from book onto ceramic tiles for in-
dividual retail sale); William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 199o Accom-
plished? 1o-I 5 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 123,
2001), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/i 23.WL_.VARA .pdf (speculating
on whether art may be sometimes more valuable in a smaller units). Christo and Jeanne-
Claude are two artists famous for wrapping buildings, islands, and even the German Reich-
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Most people cannot afford to purchase a recognized Picasso lithograph for
$100,000, but some may be willing to spend $100 for a one-square-inch
section of the lithograph in order to be the "owner" of a Picasso."1 4 Under
§ 106 and the holding of the Rodrigue H court, this desecration of a work of
art would be an economically income maximizing exchange under § 106;
in other words, a prudent exploitation of the economic rights of the copyright
owner. However, in the case of a VARA-protected work, the author clearly
has a separate and independent moral right to prevent this mutilation. 15 ' '
Further, the statute grants an author, not a copyright owner the legal
right to protect a VARA work of visual art from "any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation[]" or "to prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature[.]" 1 6 No state court could order an artist to waive
his or her moral rights for the economic benefit of the non-author spouse.
An order of a court protecting state law allocation of economic rights that
comes into conflict with an exercise of the personal moral rights vested
solely in the author by Congress would be preempted.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Involuntary Transfer Preemption).-Section § 201(e)
should have been given the popular name "the Russians are Coming and
the Sky Is Falling Act of 1973.' '2l7 Section 201(e) explicitly provides that
[wihen an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously
been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action
by any governmental body or other official or organization
purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title,
except as provided under title 11 [bankruptcy proceedings]."1 8
stag in fabric and later selling the fabric at the completion of the project to raise funds for
future art works. Kirk Johnson, Bureaucracy Meets Art, Delighting Christo, N.Y TIMEs, July 17,
20o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o0/07/17/us/I7artist.html; Glen Warchol, Christo's Epic Rib-
bon of Red Tape, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 18, 2011, http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.
phpid=5 I62817o&itype=cmsid.
214 See Landes, supra note 213, at to. As another real-world example, a damaged Guten-
berg Bible was dismantled in the 1920S and sold by section or by individual page to libraries
and collectors. See Pre Reforration Bibles - Gutenberg Bible, T"IE GRUBER RARE BOOKS COLLEC-
TION AND OTHER RARE BOOKS, http://www.lstc.edu/gruber/prerefbibles/gutenberg.php (last
visited Sept. 10, 2012).
215 See t7 U.S.C. § to6A (zoo6); 5.P&xtRY ON Copyi8tGwr, supra note 36, § t6-zo.
216 See § io6A(a)( 3 )(A)-(B); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 E3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
217 See generally Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 154 F Supp. 2d 432, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(describing an interesting exegesis on Soviet era property law and copyright law).
218 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006).
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While it was the intent of Congress with § 201(e) to preclude the
U.S. courts from recognizing the appropriation of a copyright by a foreign
government, the clear language of§ 201(e) preempts state laws, including the
common law, from involuntarily transferring initial. copyright ownership. 1 9
In 1973, the then-Union.of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) joined the
Universal Copyright Convention.2 0 Congress feared that dissent Soviet
authors would be intimidated into transferring their copyrights, that their
copyrights would be expropriated (nationalized), or that their copyrights
would be confiscated through some sham judicial process by the USSR."2 '
The government of the USSR would then use its ownership of copyrights
to petition U.S. courts to enjoin the publication of dissent works.12 There
was no evidence that the USSR ever attempted to use whatever putative
claim it may have had to the works of its citizens to enforce its rights under
copyright law. Besides, the Universal Copyright Convention would not
219 Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The Unconstitutionality of State Motion Picture Film
Lien Laws (or How Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 91-92 (1989); see also 3-10
MELVILLE NIM'MER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § io.O4 (1989) ("By its terms
Section 261(e) is not limited to acts by governmental bodies and officials. It includes acts of
seizure, etc.; by any 'organization' as well. It is, moreover, not limited to such acts by foreign
governments, officials, and organizations."); PATRY ON COPYRIGHT supra note 36, § 4:76 ("Any
involuntary transfer should be void under the plain language of section 2o1(e) .... ").
220 Martin &Smith, supra note 219, at 91-92. American courts (and government) looked
oh the government of the USSR with (at best) unconcealed skepticism. See Zschernig v. Mill-
er, 389 U.S. 429,436 n. 6 (1968) ("Russia had no separation of powers, too much control in the
hands of the Communist Pary, no independent judiciary, confused legislation, unpublished
statutes, and unrepealed obsolete statutes."). Before stating its holding of no reciprocity, the
court also noted Stalin's crimes, the Beria trial, the doctrine of crime.by analogy, Soviet xeno-
phobia, and demonstrations at the American Embassy in Moscow unhindered by the police.
The coutt concluded that a leading Soviet jurist's construction of article 8 of the law enacting
the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code seemed modeled after Humpty Dumpty, who said, "When I use a
word * * *, it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Id. at 435 n.6 (citing
another source).
221 Id. at 91; see 119 Cong. Rec. S 1359, 9387-88 (daily ed. March 26, 1973) (statement
of John McClellan). Senator McClellan considered the USSR's adherence to the Universal
Copyright Convention as a stratagem to suppress works "of literature which does not meet
with Communist approval." Id. at 9387. In March 1973, Senator McClellan introduced legisla-
tion that was the inspiration for section zoi(e) of the 1976 Copyright Act. Martin & Smith,
supra note 219, at 92 n. 185. "That bill provided that any copyright would remain the property
of the author.., regardless of any law, decree or other act of a foreign state or nation which pur-
ports to divest the author or said other persons of the United States copyright in his work. The
same principle also appeared in H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., I st Sess., § 104(c) (1975)." Id. (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nevins, Jr., supra note 7, at 383-86.
222 Martin & Smith, supra note 219, at 92. But see MIRA, T SUNDARA RmAN, COPYRIGHT
AND CREATIVE FREEDOM: A STUDY OF POST-SOCIALIST LAW REFORM 104-07 (Routledge 2oo6)
(discussing two examples of the former USSR acting on "behalf" of a Soviet author objecting
on French moral rights grounds to a translation and a moral rights claim on behalf of a Soviet
composer involving the use of public domain music in a motion picture soundtrack).
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have required U.S. courts to recognize the USSR's appropriation of an
author's copyright."2 3
Any attempt at using copyright law to censure the publication of a
copyrighted work would raise serious First Amendment questions as
well as questions regarding the prudential policies underlying equitable
remedies."2 4 When the public interest is involved, courts have broad
discretion in granting an injunction or crafting appropriate equitable
relief.2 5 The First Amendment values of promoting and protecting free
and robust speech coupled with the core constitutional (and statutory)
copyright values of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts
though the creation and dissemination of copyrighted works would caution
against granting an injunction under these circumstances. And, "[w]here
an important public interest would be prejudiced; the reasons for denying
injunctive relief may be compelling."2 16 Copyright law is not a robust
enough tool to censure ideas. Copyright only protects the expression of an
idea and not the underlying idea being expressed, so even an injunction
would only stop the dissemination of the dissent-authored work and not
the ideas contained within the work. If Congress repealed or clarified the
scope of § 201(e), the many preemption problems discussed in this article
might be eliminated.2 7 An author's initial legal interest in a copyright could
then be reduced to just another species of personal property that could
then be disposed of through either a voluntary transfer or an involuntary
transfer by operation of state law. However, despite numerous revisions to
the Copyright Act, and vituperative criticism by courts and commentators,
Congress has demonstrated no inclination to repeal § 201(e).
One significant weakness in the Worth court's opinion is that it did
not consider § 201(e) of the Copyright Act when analyzing whether
§ 201 preempted California's community property laws, at least insofar
as these laws purport to enable the conversion of a copyright owned by
the authoring spouse into a copyright co-owned with the non-authoring
223 Martin & Smith, supra note 219, at 92 & nn. 185-86 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 219, § 10.04, at 10-41 to 10-42 (1989) ("Universal Copyright Convention would not have
forced American courts to recognize any Soviet seizure .... ); see also Paul Goldstein, Preempt-
ed State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24
UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1123-27 (1977); NIMMER & NIMME, supra note 219, § 10.04.
224 See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (stating that a court "may" enjoin infringement); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,505 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 578, n.to (1994)) ("[Gloals of copyright law are not always best served by automati-
cally granting injunctive relief.").
225 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 66I, 670 (944).
226 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
227 Alternatively, states could pass laws changing the definition of community property.
But see William Patty, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SocY 237, 237 n-3 (198o) (explaining that some states define community property
in the state constitution).
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spouse. Surprisingly, the Worth court also did not consider whether the
author-spouse's agreement to a stipulated judgment"2 8 was sufficient to
legally effect a voluntary transfer under § 201(e).2 9 In other words, the
court did not analyze the agreement or determine whether this agreement
could have provided an independent ground on which to rest its decision.
Commentators and other critics may wish to give the Worth court the benefit
of the doubt and speculate that the stipulated judgment was the unstated
reason why the court did not opine on the vexatious problems presented
by § 201(e).23 ° In contrast, the § 201(e) issues were clearly addressed in the
Rodrigue district court opinion and raised again on appeal. Therefore, there
is no apparent reason why the appeals court in Rodrigue H did not squarely
face the troublesome question of the "voluntariness" of the copyright
transfer by operation of state law.2 11
Eschewing the first rule of statutory interpretation that courts do not
look to the legislative history unless the text of the statute is unclear, the
leading commentators rely on the legislative history in order to divine what
Congress intended by § 201(e). 3 "The House Report states that Section
201(e) would not inhibit transfers of ownership pursuant to proceedings in
bankruptcy and mortgage foreclosures, because in such cases the author,
by his overt conduct in filing in bankruptcy, or hypothecating a copyright,
has consented to such a transfer." 3 ' Allowing "voluntariness" of transfer to
be inferred from certain conduct is inconsistent with the requirement of
statutory formalities in other provisions of the Copyright Act. For example,
under § 204, a transfer of ownership has to be executed in a signed writing,
and § 101 defines a transfer of ownership to include a mortgage.234 A
mortgage is a voluntary agreement and under copyright law it is also a
voluntary transfer of ownership so that in the case of default, the mortgagor
228 "The parties agree that future royalties from the books ... listed on the Petition,
along with all reprints sh all be paid equally to Petitioner and Respondent .... The parties
agree that the court shall reserve jurisdiction over any issues that may subsequently arise
regarding the distinction between a re-edition or complete reworking of any book which is
community property." In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
229 Rodrigue 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534,543 (E.D. La. 1999).
230 See PATRY supra note 36, § 5: 116 & n6.5o (citing Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertain-
ment, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131-32 (C.D. Cal. 2008)) (stating that consent judgments
are voluntary).
231 One may read into the Rodrigue H opinion that because only the § io6 rights were
vested in the author, and not the concomitant economic rights, that there was no transfer, and
therefore, no reason to discuss whether there was a voluntary transfer under § 2oi(e).
232 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, § 5.A.6, at.5:2i; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, §
6A.o3; PATRY supra note 36, § 5: 116.
233 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2I9, § 10.04 (1989); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21
§ 5. 1.6, at 5:2 1; PATRY supra note 36, § 5:1 16.
234 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 204, 1o (zoo6). Seealso 17 U.S.C. § Io6A(e)(i)(2oo6) (requiring that
a VARA waiver be in writing); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 E3d 6o8, 61 4 (7th Cir. 1999).
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could sell the copyright without contravening § 201(e).135 Congress later
added Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings which are now included as an
express exception in § 201(e). Of note, the bankruptcy estate only consists
of works that have already been created or are at least in progress, and not
prospective works to be created in the future.2 36 There may be some small
subset of transfers by operation of law (other than by marriage) where there
is conduct arguably manifesting consent, but there is no writing. Curiously,
Congress made no separate or special provision for actions brought by the
Internal Revenue Service or for state insolvency proceedings.
Considering that § 201(e) does not expressly require a writing,
commentators contend that any voluntary conduct or course of conduct
that is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to transfer a § 106 copyright is
sufficient under § 201(e).2 37 To the degree that voluntariness under.§ 201(e)
is determined in reference to state law, this is a sound interpretation of the
state community property law's default rules relating to place of marriage
or change of domicile in determining property rights in property acquired
during the marriage. 38 However, rather than create legal default rules that
presume through some attenuated process that starts with a decision to
marry or to live in a community property state and concludes therefrom
that there has been an initial voluntary transfer of a copyright, this
article contends that the language of § 201(e) and the legislative purpose
behind this section requires that each initial transfer of copyright must be
accompanied by an objective manifestation of voluntary consent.
Commentators avoid the nettlesome constitutional and statutory
questions presented by § 201(e) by weaving levels of legal fictions that
create the illusion of voluntariness, permitting the conversion of an
ownership of the federal copyright vested solely in the author-spouse into
a species of community property with shared ownership transferred by
235 See Rodrigue 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989 (t978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963).
236 See I PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 36, § 1:83 (citing Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95 -598,95th Cong., zd Sess., 92 Stat. 2676) ("The first substantive amendment to the Act
occurred in November 1978, when Section 201(e) was revised to permit involuntary transfers
under the Bankruptcy Code.").
237 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2 1, § 5.1.6; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 6A.o3; PA-
TRY supra note 36, § 5: 116. The danger of a doctrine of ambiguous consent vitiates Congress's
intent to protect authors. Cf Scheer v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 1969)
(finding sculptural work created by two on-duty enlisted soldiers during the draft-era U.S.
Army as the "suggestion" of a superior officer, the Deputy Post Commander, to be done as
part of a "voluntarily formulated employment relationship" thus resulting in a work-for-hire).
238 See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY § 9 1 (zd ed. E 97 t); see also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63
CAL. L. REV. 257, 324 (I990) ("The consent of the owner...places his property in a particular
state, and subjects that property to the law of such state. The consent of the individual, in
electing a particular land as his domicile, subjects him to the sovereign of that land, those laws
he thus elects as binding on himself.") (citation omitted).
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operation of state law. 39 Leading commentators posit that by voluntarily
entering into a marriage in a community property state or establishing
residence in a community property state, an author also voluntarily agrees
to one (or more) of the following: co-ownership (tenants-in-common)
under Worth, a sharing of the fructus of the copyright under Rodrigue, or
tertium quid-some new, and as yet unknown, ownership status(es) to
be devised later.2 14 Allowing mere conduct without even an express oral
agreement to determine voluntariness under § 201(e) seems to be at odds
with the purposes behind § 204(a) and inconsistent with the purposes of
the Copyright Act. 41 To indulge in the fiction that consent to marry or to
domicile in a community property state also constitutes an unknowing but
voluntary prospective consent to alienate copyrights in works that have
not yet been conceived renders the voluntary element of a § 20 1(e) initial
transfer of a copyright from an author vacuous, if not nugatory.242
The irony of this argument is demonstrated in the context of
individuals marrying in a common law jurisdiction and then later moving
to a community property jurisdiction. In the case of a relocating couple,
a court must either refuse to indulge in the fiction that marriage in (or
creation during marriage while domiciled in) a community property state
constitutes a voluntary consent to division of copyright property through
marriage, conclude the decision to remain married in a community property
239 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2 1, § 5.1.6, at 5:22 to 5:23; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
33, § 6A.o3; PATRYSUpra note 36, § 5:116.
240 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 6A.o3. Allowing mere conduct without even
an express oral agreement to determine voluntariness under § 201(e) seems to be at odds
with the purposes behind § 204(a) and inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act.
See Davis v. Blige, 505 F3d 90, io8 (zd Cir. 2007) ("[T]he purpose of the writing requirement
in the Copyright Act of 1976 was 'to protect copyTight holders from persons mnistakenly or
fraudulently claiming oral licenses....') (quoting Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment
Co., 697 E2d 27, 36 (2d Cit. 1982)); Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F2d 555, 556-57
(9th Cit. 199o); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.zd 945, 949 (9th Cit.
1954) ("The clearest language is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his labor. Such
language is lacking here."); PATRY supra note 36, § 5:106. Butsee NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 37, § 1o.03[A][2].
241 SeeDavis, 505 E3d at io8 ("[Tihe purpose of the writing requirement in the Copy-
right Act of 1976 was 'to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or fraudulently
claiming oral licenses .... ') (quoting Eden Toys, F.d at 36); Effects Assocs., 908 E2d at 557;
Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 949 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("The
clearest language is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his labor. Such language is
lacking here."); PATRY supra note 36, § 5:106. But see NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 37,
§ 10.03 [A][z], 10-45.
242 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009) ("voluntary, adj. (14c) I. Done by
design or intention <voluntary act>."). This interpretation of marriage truly gives a new mean-
ing to the wedding vow, "With this ring I thee wed ... with all my worldly goods [including
copyrights] I [voluntarily] thee endow." See EPISCOPAL CHURCH, BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
119(2010).
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state is sufficient voluntary conduct to constitute a voluntary waiver of
§ 20i(e) rights, or find that the copyright remained vested in the author.
In jurisdictions recognizing post-cohabitation property rights analogous
to those recognized in Marvin v. Marvin or jurisdictions like Washington
state that recognize meretricious relationships,43 the conduct of sharing bed
and board might suffice as conduct by which a court may infer a voluntary
transfer of a copyright under § 201 (e). The cohabitation relationship is more
problematic for the purposes of determining whether an initial transfer of
copyright is voluntary; at least in the marital community property setting the
author-spouse has formally and voluntarily entered into a legally binding
relationship, which both spouses know will affect their economic rights in
after-acquired property, However, in the case of cohabiting partners, there
is no legal formality and the partners may not even be aware of the legal
consequences of their relationship on their individual property rights until
the relationship terminates and the court partitions the property.
Finally, one may speculate whether courts would find that the reverse
is true and indulge in the legal fiction that changing one's domicile from
a community property state constitutes a disavowal of any continued
intention to make a voluntary copyright transfer for works created after
domiciling in a common law jurisdiction. Alternatively, one might consider
whether any court could view a move to a common law jurisdiction as a
signal that there was never an initial intent either to voluntarily transfer
co-ownership of the copyright or to share the economic proceeds with the
non-author spouse by operation of the law.244
4. Federal Conflict or Field Preemption.-Absent the express preemption of
a state law or a conflict between state law and the Constitution (or other
federal law), state regulation may still be preempted by federal law if
"[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it";245
"the Act of Congress [I touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject"; 46 or "the state policy may produce a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."147
Copyright law arises out of an explicit grant of power to Congress in
the United States Constitution.148 Congress's regulation of copyright is
243 See infra Part IV.
z44 See generally Kingma, supra note 132 (discussing the property issues that spouses face
in divorce, having resided in more than one state during marriage).
245 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230(I947) (citations omitted).
246 Id. (citation omitted).
247 Id. (citation omitted).
248 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417,460 (1984).
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comprehensive and plenary.2 49 The 1976 Copyright Act might better be
called a copyright code.250 Congress has comprehensively legislated in all
aspects of the life of a copyright from its "birth" to its "death" and ultimate
entry into the afterlife of the public domain. Congress not only specifies that
the copyright should initially vest in the author (without defining who is an
author), 5 ' but also creates different statutory authorial forms (e.g., individual
authors, joint-authors, work-made-for-hire authors, and collective work
authors). 5 Congress also specifies specific processes and formalities for
conveying subsequent legal ownership in the copyright depending on
the legal form of the authorship. 3 Congress has defined the scope of
the subject matter of copyright"M and the timing of its initial vesting. .5
Congress excludes U.S. government works from copyright protection.
256
Congress provides for the exclusive rights that define the copyright257 then
limits those rights"5 ' and implements compulsory licenses.25 9 Congress has
established the processes for transferring copyrights, established limitations
on transfers of copyrights, and provided for the termination of transfers of
copyrights.2 60 Congress has also created a registration process for copyrights,
including a method for recording transfers of ownership or other interests
in the Copyright Act that preempts state recordation systems.261 Congress
249 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,419 (1984).
250 Cf. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 223 (1985) ("Congress adopted a com-
prehensive revision of the Copyright Act."); Johnston v. Smith, No. i:9 5 -CV- 5 95-RCF, 1997
WL 584349, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June io, '997) ("[Tlhe Copyright Act is ... a comprehensive
legislative scheme....").
251 See Merchant v. Levy, 92 E3d 51,55 (2d Cir. 1996); Shubha Ghosh, Copyright As Priva-
tization: The Case of Model Codes, 78 TuL. L. REv. 653, 710 (2004).
252 17 U.S.C. § 20l(a)-(c) (2o06); id. § io (defining "joint work" and "work made for
hire").
253 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
254 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2oo6); id. § 1o3; Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237,
1241 (2010) ("Congress has crafted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the exis-
tence and scope of '[clopyright protection' for 'original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression."') (citing 17 U.S.C. § ioz(a)).
255 17 U.S.C. § 20).
256 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
257 17 U.S.C. § io6 (2006); see also id. § 114.
258 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2006).
259 17 U.S.C. § II, 115, 116,118 (2oo6).
26o 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006); Gillespie v. AST Sportswear, Inc., No. 97Civ. 1911 (PKL), 2001
WL 18o147, at *7 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2oo1) ("The Copyright Act prescribes a comprehensive
scheme for the licensing of copyrighted works.").
261 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-412 (2006); Fodere v. Lorenzo, No. 09-CV-23120, 2011 WL 465468,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011) ("Title 17 of the United States Code lays out a comprehensive
scheme for the registration and protection of copyrights in the United States."); Peregrine
Entm't, Ltd. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver, 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 199o)
("[Tihe comprehensive scope of the federal Copyright Act's recording provisions, along with
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provides for the rights of the author's survivors, 6 defines and penalizes
copyright infringement (including both civil and criminal penalties), 63
establishes the term of copyright protection, 64 and even defines terms
such as "children," "widow," and "widower"26 -- legal status categories
that Congress traditionally left by default or by design to the individual
states.2 6 Finally, Congress ousts state courts from all copyright disputes
arising under the Copyright Act and vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts.1
67
That Congress intended for copyrights to be governed by federal law
and construed by federal courts alone is further illustrated by the fact that
where Congress wishes to defer to states in the Copyright Act, it does so
unequivocally. For example, Congress enacted three specific statutory
preemption provisions that preempt state la*. 61 More subtly, while the
Copyright Act defines the term "widow" or "widower" in reference to
individual state law, 69 Congress does not look to individual state law to
define the term "children." ' Further, while Congress permits a copyright
itself to be bequeathed or pass through state intestate succession,", it
rejects state intestate succession or even voluntary bequests by the author
the unique federal interests they implicate, support the view that federal law preempts state
methods of perfecting security interests in copyrights and related accounts receivable.").
262 17 U.S.C. § 203 (zoo6).
263 17 U.S.C. § 50 -5o8, 510-513 (2oo6); 17 U.S.C. §§ 602,603 (2oo6); Molinelli-Freytes
v. Univ. of PR., 727 F. Supp. 2d 6o, 66 (D. P.R. 2010) ("[Tlhe Copyright Act provides a com-
prehensive and detailed damages scheme .. "); Gemcraft Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F.
Supp. 289, 293 (E.D. Tex. 1988) ("The Copyright Act, like ERISA, provides a comprehensive
scheme of remedies for violations ... "); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist. No. ioo, 666
F. Supp. 1278, 1283 (W.D. Ark. 1987) ("[Tlhe Act provides a comprehensive enforcement
scheme and remedies for infringement of copyright.").
264 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2oo6).
265 17 U.S.C. § 1o1 (2006).
266 See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956); Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 3-4
(1st Cir. 2000).
267 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2oo6) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights .... No State court
shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to..
• copyrights."). See also section III.A.
268 17 U.S.C. § 201(e); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (f) (2oo6).
269 17 U.S.C. § iot ("The author's 'widow' or 'widower' is the author's surviving spouse
under the law of the author's domicile at the time of his or her death, whether or not the
spouse has later remarried.").
270 Id. ("A person's 'children' are that person's immediate offspring, whether legitimate
or not, and any children legally adopted by that person."), legislatively overruling De Sylva, 351
U.S. at 5o--8s (looking to state law to define "childten").
271 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2oo6). The recordation provisions of the Copyright Act govern
disputes regarding subsequent transfers of the copyright while "[s]tate law governs all other
aspects of copyright mortgages, including construction, effect and foreclosure." PAUL GOLD-
STEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.1.5,5:19 n.68 (Supp. 2007).
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of the author's copyright termination rights."' Final evidence of Congress's
preemptory intentions is that federal courts do not usually refer to the laws
of one particular state when asked to interpret the Copyright Act; rather,
they often create federal common law. 73
Copyright is an area of federal law where national uniformity is
paramount. 7 4 Applying the laws of different community property states
(or equitable distribution states) will. result in a chaotic body of post-
dissolution copyright ownership law.7 ' This cacophony of conflicting
law will rise to a crescendo as common law states, equitable distribution
jurisdictions, and jurisdictions that provide some property protection to
unmarried cohabiting couples join in the chorus of state courts opining on
copyright ownership.27 6
Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory copyright scheme that
both expressly and implicitly displaces state law through a blend of
express, conflict, and field preemption. Copyright law is now a significant
foreign relations issue, and the Copyright Act has been amended to
conform to the United States's treaty obligations under the Universal
Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention, and TRIPS.77 In the arena
of international relations it is particularly important that the United States
speak with one consistent voice. 78
In the Copyright Act, Congress specifically excludes the states from
regulating in many areas, including in certain aspects of family law, an area
in which the state's police powers are historically treated as paramount in
our federal system. Congress defines family law terms for Copyright Act
purposes in a manner that may be inconsistent with a state's definition
of the term. Congress also displaces state law dealing with the transfer
272 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(D) (zoo6).
273 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989); Cincom
Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 E3d 431,436 (6th Cir. 2009).
274 See Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163 (1989); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551 (973); THE
FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
275 Compare In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that divorced spouses are co-owners of the copyright), and Rodigue 11, 218 F.3 d 432, 435-36
(5 th Cir. 2000) (finding that author-spouse has ownership-management rights but must share
fruits of the copyright), with Nevins, Jr., supra note 87, at 517-18, and Patry, supra note 158
(comparing Texas and California community property statutes). See generally Kingma, supra
note 132.
276 See Moore v. Ferrie (In reMarriage of Moore & Ferrie), 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543,547 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Kessler, 203 N.E.zd 221, 222-23 (Ohio 1964); 15B AM. JUR. 2D
Community Property § 17 (2011).
277 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 879-82 (2012) (discussing the Berne Convention
and TRIPS); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 159-6o (1985). See generally S. REP. No.
352, (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 37o6,.
278 Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (determining that states may not
establish their own "foreign policy" through their probate courts).
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of copyrights by enacting specific provisions that might be described as
the micromanagement of bequests and intestate succession. 79 Courts
have repeatedly referred to the 1976 Copyright Act as a comprehensive
scheme. Other bodies have treated it as a comprehensive scheme, too. For
example, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 provisions yield to federal
law regarding how to perfect a security interest in a registered copyright.8 0
In sum, the express preemption provisions of the Copyright Act, the
apparent conflict between state laws governing property at the dissolution
of a relationship and federal copyright law, and a clear intent by Congress to
occupy the field of copyright law and to displace most state law in the area
lead inescapably to the conclusion that state domestic relations law must
yield to federal copyright law.
E. Preemption, Community Property, and Termination of Transfer Rights
(17 U.S.C. § 203)
One of the rights of an author under copyright law is the right to
terminate the transfer of copyright ownership, including lesser non-
ownership rights such as a non-exclusive license.18 Therefore, regardless of
what a state court may decree as part of the property settlement, Congress
has vested in the author-spouse, the widow(er), and the author's children
the ultimate right to terminate that transfer. Importantly for the analysis,
"[tiermination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant."8 2 Thus, even if a state's law assumes that the author-spouse
granted an interest in the copyright through the voluntary act of marriage,
the author-spouse may still terminate that transfer under § 203. To exercise
the termination right, the author-spouse or the author-spouse's statutory
heirs must give notice neither less than two nor more than five years after
thirty-five years have passed since the initial transfer.8 3
A related section, § 203(b)(5), appears to superficially limit the
application of § 203(a)( 5 ). Section 203(b)(5) provides that "[t]ermination
of a grant under this section affects only those rights covered by the grants
that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any
279 Cf. Tritt, supra note 15, at 182-84 (circumventing copyright law with will contracts).
28o See U.C.C. §§ 9-I o9(c)(i), 9-31 !(a) (1998); In reWorld Auxiliary Power Co., 303 E3d
I 120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002); Nat'l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Denver
(In re Peregrine Entm't, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 200 (C.D. Cal. 199o).
281 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006).
282 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5); see 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 36, § 25:74,
nn.5-6 (201 2).
283 Of course, if state law or the agreement permits, the rights may be terminated prior
to the thirty-five year period. See Walthal v. Rusk, 172 E3d 481,485 (7 th Cir. 1999); Korman v.
HBC Fla., Inc, 182 F.3d 129!, 1295 (i ith Cir. j909). Butsee Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 Fd
58o, 585 (9th Cir. 1993).
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other Federal, State, or foreign laws." Yet the legislative history clearly
states:
Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in this legislation
is intended to extend any license or transfer made for a period
of less than thirty-five years. Likewise nothing in this section or
legislation is intended to change the existing state of the law of
contracts concerning the circumstances in which an author may
terminate a license, transfer or assignment. [Section 203(b)(6)]
provides that unless and until termination is effected under this
section, the grant, "if it does not provide otherwise," continues
for the term of copyright. The quoted language means that the
agreement does not provide for a term of less than thirty-five
years.2 4
From this explanation, it is clear that § 203(b)(5) would not provide a state
law exception to the author's termination rights in order to accommodate
a settlement or court decree in a marital dissolution proceeding in a
community property state.
In the context of community property law, it is not clear when the
transfer originally took place. If under state law the non-author spouse
accrued an "operation by law transfer" upon the creation of a work during
marriage then that would start the thirty-five year period. However, if the
transfer does not take place until the entry of the court order allocating the
individual interest in the copyright, that would then be the starting point to
determine when the thirty-five year period commenced.
Probably the better interpretation of when the initial transfer occurs
under community property law is upon the fixation of the copyrighted
work.15 The court decree dividing the copyright interests vested in the
marital community is not a new transfer. 86 It is merely an award of the
existing copyright interest that was initially transferred from the author by
operation of state law. Therefore, the transfer that the author-spouse may
seek to terminate is the initial one to the marital community. Terminating
this initial transfer will also terminate any subsequent transfer by either
pre-dissolution by the marital estate or by the court in the dissolution
proceeding. This could lead to ludicrous results where a spouse of many
years finds that the copyrighted work is transferred'out of the marital estate
and a brand new spouse may enjoy the fruits of the copyright for many
years to come. Yet it is a more principled rule than to assume either that the
copyright is separate property (thus never entered into the marital estate)
or that it exists in the ether of property law and is to be characterized and
284 S. REP. No. 94-473, at 125 (1975).
285 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2oo6).
286 A settlement agreement is more problematic. The language of the settlement agree-
ment could create a new transfer of the copyright or potentially, if the settlement is in the ter-
mination period, waive the right to terminate the transfer. See Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen
Slesinger, Inc., 43o E3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2oo6).
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transferred only when a court so orders. Whatever rights the divorced
spouse may claim under state law, federal law is clear that the termination
right may be exercised only by the author, the author's statutory heirs
under the Copyright Act, or, if no surviving statutory heirs, the executor of
the author's estate.2 87
In sum, the termination of transfer right presents numerous problems in
the allocation of copyrights in a divorce proceeding, all of which raise issues
of preemption. First, as mentioned above, regardless of the status of the
copyright under state law as marital property, whatever state courts order as
part of a divorce proceeding, or even if the divorce settlement is voluntary,
the author-spouse has an unwaivable federal right to terminate the transfer
of the copyright.," Second, regardless of the intent of the author or the
courts, if the author does not survive into the period in which he or she may
elect to terminate the transfer, then the termination right statutorily vests
in the author's then-widow(er) and children (per stirpes) and not in the
divorced spouse.28 9 Under copyright law, it is the widow(er) or children who
may exercise these rights rather than the divorced spouse. 90 Consequently,
even if a copyright becomes part of the community property estate by
operation of law, it will remain there at the sufferance of the author-spouse,
and a state court's ability to manage the copyright assets as part of the
divorce proceeding is extremely limited.
F Summary of Copyright Preemption
Despite the leading cases of Worth and Rodrigue, whether a copyright
can be conveyed through operation of law in a community property state
is still an open question. 91 In its opinion, the Worth court did not consider
287 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). See I-6ANIMMER & NIMMER,supra note 33, § 6A.o3[CI[s].
z88 See 17 U.S.C. § 2o3(a)(5); N & D E Co. v. Gustings, Civ. A. No. 90-4445, 1992 WL
77581, at *4 (E.D. La. April 9, 1992).
289 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 E3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 2005);
Troutman v. Estate of Troutman, 937 N.E.zd 173, 177 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
290 Under the Copyright Act, the question of who is an eligible widow(er) is determined
in reference to state law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) ("The author's 'widow' or 'widower' is the
author's surviving spouse under the law of the author's domicile at the time of his or her
death, whether or not the spouse has later remarried."). States seem to preclude a divorced
spouse from the privileges of widow(er)hood. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Schwerin (In re McCarthy's
Estate), 73 P.2d 9IO, 9IO-I I (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Opdahl v. Johnson, 28 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1940); In re Chomsky's Estate, 1O N.Y.S.2d 6o, 61 (Sur. Ct. 1950); see also HOWARD B.
ABRAMS, 2 TIE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 12:21 (2011); Nevins, Jr., supra note 87, at 510-12.
291 See PATRY supra note 36, § 5:116. California has a'sui generis statutory law of com-
munity property. See BAssET-r, supra note 17, § 1:4. In Rodrigue II, the Fifth Circuit relied on
a unique aspect of Louisiana civil law, which is the only civil law jurisdiction in the United
States. Accordingly, these cases regarding community property may be only instructive in
their specific jurisdictions. See Nevins, Jr., supra note 87, at 517-18. Lawyers with clients who
have assets in community property jurisdictions are advised to consider whether to address
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§ 201(e) when it analyzed whether the general principles of§ 201 preempted
California's community property laws insofar as they purported to convert
the sole copyright ownership of the authoring spouse to one co-owned
with the non-authoring spouse. 9 By contrast, the Rodrigue II avoided the
§ 201(e) issue by focusing instead on the § 106 exclusive rights that
constitute the copyright as a property right bundle of sticks. Specifically,
the Rodrigue H court severed copyright ownership into the right to manage
or control the alienation or licensing of the copyrighted and the right to
receive the economic benefits that flow from the alienation or licensing
of the work. 93 The court thus converted a copyright estate of tenancy in
its entirety into a new previously unknown legal estate, a sort of pseudo-
"profit a prendre," with a half-benefit to the non-author spouse through a
novel and strained interpretation of Louisiana community property law.
The author-spouse retained the right to manage the copyrighted work, but
he had to share the economic proceeds derived from his copyright with the
non-author spouse.
No court has yet addressed federal preemption under § 106A, the
Visual Artists Rights Act, in the context of a state community property
dissolution proceeding. Consequently, jurists, scholars, and commentators
are left to speculate about the effects of VARA on marital dissolutions
that must account for author's moral rights in works of visual art. Divorce
law practitioners, estate planners, and attorneys for the creative content
industries are left to engage in costly prophylactic planning for theoretical
possibilities regarding how each state's community property law and the
federal law governing copyright ownership may develop over time in
different federal circuits and state courts. There is a real possibility that
state court judgments regarding copyright ownership may have to be re-
litigated in federal court before questions regarding title are authoritatively
settled.
IV. LOVE AND MARRIAGE AND PARTNERSHIP
Both principles of sound copyright law and policy and the law of federal
preemption require that copyright law and state law be harmonized in
order to promote the progress of science and the useful arts as provided
intellectual property assets, especially copyrights and patents, in a prenuptial or postnuptial
agreement. Regardless of whether it is a community property jurisdiction or a common law
equitable distribution jurisdiction, lawyers licensing copyrights or purchasing copyright assets
may wish to obtain consent from all parties in the marital community. See, e.g., Rodrigue v.
Rodrigue, Civ. A. No. 95-2862, 19 9 6WL 1093o9, at *2 (E.D. La. March 13, 1996) ("[Spouse
argued that the contract was void because she] was not aware of, did not agree to the contents
of the agreement and the amendment nor did she renounce her right to concur in the alien-
ation of the community owned artwork.").
292 In ie Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
293 Rodrigue I1, zi8 F3d 432, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2000).
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for by the Constitution. Harmonization will promote finality in the state
proceedings that terminate the social and economic relationship subsumed
in the marital construct. This section will explore the nature of a business
partnership and whether the economic aspects of the marital relationship
may be instantiated or distilled into form of a legal partnership. While
this section of the article will theorize on whether a community property
marriage is also a business entity partnership, the following section will
discuss the advantages of treating the marriage as a partnership under
copyright law.
Marriage has or is at least reputed to have a dual nature. To some,
marriage is the legal embodiment of the symbolic or spiritual union of
two people becoming one flesh." 4 But marriage is also an institution in
which two distinct individuals enter into a commercial relationship.9 5 This
commercial relationship may be analogized to a business entity partnership,
and this article argues that it is this view of the marriage that should be
the focus for determining marital property distribution issues that involve
ownership of copyrighted works.,"The dual nature of marriage is recognized
in community property jurisdictions. For example, a spouse may petition
a court to to partition the community property (including its profits and
losses) without terminating the legal marriage. 97 The marital community
as a legal entity separate and apart from the individual spouses is well
established in some states. 98 The social and economic duality of marriage,
from its historic religious underpinnings and overt sexuality to its economic
aspects, has rendered marriage a fetish to the judiciary and legislatures.
Judicial and legislative anxiety about the nature of the relationship has
resulted in laws and policies that conflate love, marriage, sex, and the
economic union of two people. An inordinate fear of reducing marriage to
sex and money has rendered many a jurist or legislature impotent, By
294 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1858); Genesis 2:24 ("Therefore a man
leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh."); see also
BARBARA ENGLER, PERSONALITY THEoRIES: AN INTRODUCTION 352 (8th ed. 2oo9) (describing
marriage as meeting a higher order need); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and
the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEo. L.J. 301, 307-08 (1995).
295 See Wissiner v. Wissiner, 338 U.S. 655, 660 (1950) ("ITihe community property prin-
ciple rests upon something more than the moral obligation of supporting spouse and children:
the business relationship of man and wife for their mutual monetary profit."). Cf Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with
a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intel-
lectual and emotional makeup.").
296 See generally DE FUNIAK AND VAUGHN, supra note 238, § 95 (describing the nature of a
community property jurisdiction marriage as a "general partnership").
297 See DE FUNIAK AND VAUGHN, supra note 238, § 129.
298 See, e.g., Keene v. Edie, 935 P2d 588,584 (Wash. 1997).
299 Cf. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.zd io6, I io (Cal. 1976) ("The courts should enforce ex-
press contracts between nonvarital [sic] partners except to the extent that the contract is ex-
plicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services.").
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contrast, in cohabitation arrangements outside of marriage, courts have used
contract or business entity principles to analyze cohabitation agreements in
order to create default rules regarding-allocating property acquired during
the period of cohabitation.300 Courts have been willing to recognize these
new legal relationships and endow them with quasi-community property
status regarding any property acquired during the relationship. But
courts will only recognize these relationships to the degree that they can
segregate the non-sexual nature from the sexual nature of the exchanges
between the parties in the relationship. Consequently, board but not bed
is valid consideration for the allocation of property acquired during the
relationship. 30 1
A. Partnership as Marriage and Marriage as a Business Association
It is said that while marriages are made in heaven, they are lived on
earth. Therefore, while marriage (or cohabitation) is, on the one hand, a
unique, unquantifiable human relationship whose contours are outside the
scope of this article, in daily life, marriage is also an economic relationship.
On the romantic partnership side of a marriage, the couple produces
goods and services for, intra-family or household consumption (internal
production). More importantly for this article, the business partnership
institution within a marriage produces goods and services for external trade
(external production) in order to promote the economic well being of the
couple. This article contends that the external trade production aspect of
the economics of a marriage is analogous to the economic activities of a
business partnership. This is significant because if the marital relationship
is a business partnership, then the author-spouse's copyrighted works fit
into a well-established model for disposing of partnership assets at the
dissolution of the partnership, thus avoiding the thorny issues of state and
federal preemption.
Perhaps a hypothetical moving from a conventional business partnership
to a marriage entity business partnership could make this point clearer that
there is no legal distinction between spouses as marital partners and spouses
300 See id.; Amanda J. Beane, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Vasquez v. Hawthorne
Wrongly Denied Washington's Meretricious Relationship Doctrine to Same-Sex Couples, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 475, 477 (2oo1) ("Property division at the end of a relationship that does not qualify as a
meretricious relationship is dependent on contract, partnership and restitution remedies.").
30 In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.d 328, 307 (Wash. 1984); Pennington v. Pennington
(In re Marriage of Pennington), 971 P.2d 98, ioi (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("In analyzing whether
a meretricious relationship exists, a court may consider the following non-exclusive factors:
(i) continuity of cohabitation; (2) duration of the relationship; (3) purpose of the relationship;
(4) pooling of the resources and services to accomplish common goals and projects; and (5)
intent of the parties.") (quoting Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. t995). See generally
Gavin M. Parr, What Is a "Meretricious Relationship"?: An Analysis of Cohabitant Property Rights
Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1243 (0999).
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as a business entity partnership. Assume three individuals with different
skill sets: Toby is a talented writer; Lexi has fiscal resources; and Annie is
a skilled typist.3°2 Lexi, Annie, and Toby agree that Lexi will provide Toby
with financial support (capital contribution), Annie will provide secretarial
support (in kind contribution), and Toby will write the book (copyrighted
work and in-kind contribution), and that when the book is published, they
will split the profits from the book and the book's derivative works, if any.
They also agree that if the book is a failure that they will share the losses.
The book is published; each individual takes a one-third share of the
royalties and deposits his or her check into a separate bank account. This
arrangement could be described as a common business partnership.
Eventually, two of our three partners, Lexi and Toby, fall in love and get
married. This marriage would not convert a business partnership composed
of Lexi, Toby, and Annie into some non-business entity enterprise.3 3 The
married couple Lexi and Toby would have a marriage partnership while Lexi,
Toby, and Annie would still be individual partners in a separate legal entity
business partnership. Lexi and Toby would still receive their respective
individual shares of the profits from the partnership. This result should not
change even if, by operation of state law, the profits from the partnership
become community property held jointly by Lexi and Toby as spouses-in-
common. Lexi and Toby's liabilities for the debts of the partnership remain
the same, though the amount might be paid individually out of separate
property or collectively out of community property depending on the state
where they are married. But in this hypothetical, because they share all
post-marriage earnings as a marital community or receive the same share of
profits as separate property, the net effect on Lexi-Toby's assets would be
the same. Nor should the business partnership status of this arrangement
change if Annie decides to leave the partnership. In that case, after the
winding down of Annie's interest in the partnership, Toby and Lexi would
remain both spousal-paftners and legal business-partners as they continue
to exploit the copyright in the book through licensing or conveyance
(external production). However, while the distinction between marriage
partners and business partners is legally and economically significant,
unless Toby and Lexi divorce, this is a distinction that is without practical
significance.
Once the fundamental economic nature of marriage has been discerned,
the question is whether this economic institution may be understood in light
of analogous institutions.3" The expression of marriage as a partnership is
302 If you are trying to figure out who the author is writing about, the names belong to
a friend's cats.
303 One way of conceptualizing this relationship is as investment in human capital. See
generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research 2d ed. 1975).
304 See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage As a Trade: Bridging The Private/Private Distinction, 36
[Vol. 1I
LOVE'S LABOR'S LOST
more than a polite metaphor; rather, at its core it expresses an economic truth
that marriage may be a legal business entity partnership.3 5 The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) defines a partnership as "the association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit...
whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership."3°6 Partnership law
recognizes that a husband and wife may be business partners.3"7 A neutral
examination of the economic aspects of marriage suggests that it can be
properly understood under the laws governing a business partnership.
Therefore, this section will evaluate whether a marriage in a community
property state may also constitute a legal business partnership.
The author concedes that despite the operational reality of intra-
spousal economic transactions, courts are extremely reluctant to treat
customary social and financial intra-family exchanges as commercial
transactions that support finding a distinct business partnership within a
marriage, regardless of whether the same objective economic behavior in
an arm's length transaction between strangers would constitute adequate
evidence of a business partnership. In determining whether an entity is
HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 117-18 (200).
305 The IRS, the least romantic of the many phlegmatic federal agencies, recognizes the
family partnership and provides special statutory provisions for family partnerships. 26 U.S.C.
§ 704(e) (2oo6). The IRS also recognizes the sui generis nature of the intra-family commercial
transaction. See id. Also, many non-traditional families use a legal business-entity partnership
as an alternative to or in order to strengthen personal domestic partnership agreements. See
Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in the Representa-
tion of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 85-86 (2003). Some commentators
suggest marriage is more analogous to a closely held corporation. See Ertman, supra note 304,
at 117-19.
306 Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) § 202 (1997);seealso id § Ios(6); Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) § 6(i) (1914).
307 See, e.g., Chocknok v. State, 696 P.zd 669, 673 n.4 (Alaska 1985); Gammill v. Gammill,
510 S.W.2d 66,68 (Ark. 1974); Lobato v. Paulino, 8 N.W.zd 873, 876 (Mich. '943) ("A partner-
ship is an association of two or more persons (which may include husband and wife) to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit."). At common law, spouses could not be business entity
partners. See Lord v. Parker, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 127, 128 (i86i). At one point in time, based on
antiquated and gendered notions regarding the economic role and business acumen of a wom-
an in managing community assets, there was a dispute as to whether spouses could be partners
in community property states. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 148-49 (2d ed. 197). de Funiak & Vaughn concluded that "There
would seem to be no reason, however, why the spouses might not by antenuptial contract or
by contract during marriage, in those state permitting it, provide that the legal community
should not govern their property and that they should proceed on the basis of commercial
partners.... Id. § 148. Modern laws regarding gender equality appear to have removed these
difficulties. Compare id. § 148, with Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Part-
nership: Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
367,376-77 (1998) ("By 1979, all eight community property states had amended their statutes
to eliminate discriminatory male management practices"). The fact that only recently could
women fully participate in the economic management and life of the family might explain
why the case law regarding spouses as business partners is so underdeveloped.
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both a marriage partnership and a commercial partnership. under state
law, this article posits that courts should look to the underlying economic
reality of the institution rather than treating the parties' understanding
of the relationship, religious traditions, or social conventions of marriage
as dispositive. Just as courts have moved beyond legal marriage as the
sine qua non of legally protected relationships and are now protecting
cohabiting individuals, courts should also be willing to move beyond the
social relationship construct of marriage to determine that the foundational
economic realities of the relationship are dispositive as to whether there is
also business partnership. If courts (or state legislatures) took the next step
out of their comfort zones to look objectively at the institution of marriage
and the external economic relations of the marriage, then a fair balancing of
the factors used to determine whether a social or economic relationship is
also a legal business partnership would often weigh in favor of finding that
the couple are not only spiritual partners but also legal business partners.
1. Two or More Partners.-The first element of the test to determine
whether an association legally qualifies as a partnership is that a partnership
requires two or more persons.) This element is readily satisfied by most
marriages or relationships.3 °9
2. Co-ownership.-The second element in determining whether a marital
relationship may be characterized as a partnership is whether the economic
relationship among the participants is one of co-ownership over the assets.31
The essential elements of co-ownership are profit and loss sharing, control
over the business, contributions to equity, and property-co-ownership.3 11
Co-ownership and control of property are the salient characteristics of a
business partnership that distinguish it from other potentially complex
economic relationships. The economic relations between creditor-
debtor, employer-employee, landlord-tenant, or franchisor-franchisee
relationships may mimic the business partnership form in certain aspects,
but they lack the necessary substantive qualitative similarity to meet the
statutory definition.31 These non-partnership arrangements may provide
for a share of the royalties (profits) from the on-going business entity, but
usually involve no sharing of control over property, no sharing of the risk of
308 RUPA § 202.
309 See RUPA § lo,(io) (defining "person"); Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 201 (1970),
9A U.L.A. 175 (1998); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.03 (Tentative Draft 2000) ("[D]omesticpartners are two persons of the same or
opposite sex, not married to one another.
31o RUPA § 202.
311 J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GEN-
ERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 5:11 (201 1). See RUPA § 202(a); UPA § 6(0).
312 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 31 1, §§ 5:I1-I2.
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loss, no sharing of the liabilities of the business, and no agency relationship
that permits the other party to legally bind the business.
a. Agreement to Share Profits and Losses is "Prima Facie"
Evidence of a Partnership
Section 18(a) of the Uniform Partnership Act presumes that the
contribution of each partner is equal and that each partner will share equally
of the partnership's profits and losses unless the partners agree otherwise.313
Community property law makes the same assumption regarding marital
assets.314 There is no inherent conflict between business entity law and
community property law, so the factor of equal sharing of profit and loss
may weigh in favor of finding that some marriages also constitute business
partnerships. However, in applying these laws, judges have often found it
difficult to focus on the family as a profit making institution as well as a
romantic social institution in practice.
Only poets and economists may care to speculate on whether most
marriages are profitable. However, a partnership does not actually have
to generate a profit as long as the parties enter into the relationship with
an expectation of earning and sharing the profits. A necessary corollary
to the expectation of earning profits is the realization of the risk that the
partnership may also incur losses and an appreciation of how these losses
will be allocated among the partner-participants.3 15 There is no requirement
that there be an explicit agreement to share losses; rather, courts often
infer a sharing of the risk of loss from the agreement to share profits or
from the partnership relationship itself.316 The traditional wedding vow "to
have and to hold from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer,
for poorer" explicitly recognizes this economic reality of the risk sharing
nature of marriage." 7 Parties to a community property marriage explicitly
agree to share profits and losses. t8 Courts have distinguished the payment
of profits from a partnership as wages from the receipt of profits as a
return on investment.1 9 A receipt of profits as a return on investment is
evidence of a partnership while payment of wages is merely evidence of
313 RUPA § 401(b) (1997); UPA § 18(a) (1914).
314 See Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom, 851 So. 2d 19o, 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
315 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 3 11, § 5:14.
316 See Crest Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 417 F. Supp. 564, 569 (W. D. Okla. 1976).
317 See Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401, 1402 (Okla. 1975) (declining to enforce the
ecclesiastical vows of marriage).
318 See Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655,66o (1950). See also Alexandria Streich, Spousal
Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership: Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code
of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 367, 391 (1998).
319 Lobato v. Paulino, 8 N.W.zd 873, 876 (Mich. 1943).
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employment.3"' The profits from the external economic relations of the
couple are analogous to a return on investment or the running of a small
business therefore they should be evidence of a business partnership even
if the profits are not actually distributed to the parties until the point of
dissolution or death of a spouse.
The critical distinction in the marriage context is between "sharing
gross returns as a family, which was not evidence of partnership, and a
'division' of profits, which would be evidence of partnership." 3 ' In Spence
v. Tatum, there was no attempt to segregate business assets from personal
assets, and the court found that spouse's use of the "partnership" checking
account to pay family bills and personal expenses such as a hairdresser,
restaurant meals, and maid service was not sufficient to make the spouse a
business partner.32 Further, the spouse's share was drawn from the "gross
profits" of the business. 323 This analysis appears to be a vestigial legacy of
the fiction that marriage produced one legal entity and one person. It may
also have been based in a chivalric desire to shield family assets from the
imprudent business activities of the other spouse. During the marriage, the
family without an individualized accounting may informally agree to share
the revenues of the economic partnership as individuals in the marriage
partnership. Clearly at the point of marital dissolution (either by divorce
or death) the goal of the court is to properly allocate all of the profits that
belong to the spouses as individuals, and individual charges that were not
properly attributable to the community are deducted from each partner's
share of the profits.32 4 At this point in time, the marriage partnership most
closely mirrors the traditional business entity partnership and their innate
similarities are most visible.
Courts have failed to articulate any rationale either under principles
of family law or under principles of business partnership law to support
an artificial distinction between joint-economic activities of married
individuals and the economic activities of unmarried individuals when
determining whether identical objectively measured activities should be
weighed differently when determining whether an economic relationship
meets the definition of a business partnership. 35 The better interpretation
320 Id.
321 Spence v. Tatum, 960 E2d 65,68 (8th Cir. 1992).
322 Id. at 67-69. Another way of looking at these transactions is as partnership draws
against profits that would later be accounted for when at the dissolution of the marriage when
the profits and looses are allocated to each member of the community. See Baltrusch v. Bal-
trusch, 190 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Mont. 2oo8).
323 Spence, 960 F2d 65 at 68.
324 See, e.g., DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 238, §223 (debts to creditors); § 175 (spouses
as creditors of each other); §i 19 (mismanagement of community property); §2o (self-dealing
and other breaches of fiduciary duties).
325 The best articulation of some support for this tendentious practice is found in Coo-
perv. Spencer, 238 S.E.zd 805 (Va. 1977). The court focused on the subjective understanding
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of modern partnership law would be to harmoniously interpret family law
and partnership law by applying the same test to entities composed of
individuals married to each other, single individuals who are romantically
involved and strangers who undertake a business for profit.
b. Mutual Right of Control or Management of the Business
One of the salient attributes of co-ownership is the mutual right to
control or manage the business.31 6 The control does not have to be extensive;
it is sufficient to retain minor rights of control.32 7 The partners may agree
to contract away the right to control.3"8 Analogously, in a community
property jurisdiction, "[e]ach spouse shares an equal right of management
and control over community property."3 9 In some states, either party may
unilaterally alienate the community property.330 "Where either spouse,
separately, may manage and control community property, a spouse has the
right to manage and control a business operated by the other spouse as a
sole proprietorship if the business is a community asset."33' Community
property law is therefore consistent with a finding that this factor weighs in
favor of a business partnership.
c. Capital Contributions
If the partners in a traditional business partnership agree, personal
services can be considered as non-cash capital contributions to a
partnership.332 In most marriages, each individual brings different skills
with different market values. In many marriages, especially among
younger individuals, the asset that each brings to the partnership is human
capital. By jointly sharing their human capital, they each can maximize
their earning capacity throughout their lifetime and create capital for the
partnership. Sharing of human capital in a marriage to further the interests
of the economic external relations of the couple is consistent with the
of the couple as to the business nature of their marital economic activities and the fact that
the profits from the family business were shared in gross rather than formally portioned into
individual shares. Id. at 806-07. In a community property state, this should not be a problem
because the community property law then automatically divides the gross profits into indi-
vidual spousal shares upon death or dissolution of the marriage.
326 UPA § 6(i); Id. § i8(e).
327 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 311, § 5:13.
328 Id.
329 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 316 (2oi I). Traditionally, the husband had the almost
exclusive right to manage community property. See DE FUNIAK &VAUGHN, supra note 238, § 113.
330 Id.
331 Id. (citing Dalton v. Superior Court ofArizona, 738 P.2d 365,368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)).
332 Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 284-85 (Alaska 1983) (citing cases in Alaska,
Wisconsin, and Utah); CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 311, § 5:15.
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partnership concept of capital contribution. In addition, profits or fruits of
separate property become community property and so do investments in
the marriage partnership.333
3. Business for "Profit".-Despite the obvious hopes of those many couples
who recite the pledge "for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer" at
their wedding ceremony, determining whether the relationship between
the parties to a marriage exists as a business for profit is problematic. 34
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "community
property principle rests upon something more than the moral obligation
of supporting spouse and children: the business relationship of man and
wife for their mutual monetary profit." '335 This is not merely rhetorical
surplusage. Thirty-seven years later, in Rose v. Rose, the Court stated,
"the community property concept is more akin to an amoral business
relationship. '336 The sine qua non of partnership is that it is a commercial
entity whose goal is to generate profits.337 Despite the element of "profit"
as the dispositive motivating factor behind a partnership, the term profit is
undefined in either the Uniform Partnership Act or in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act.33
"Profit" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[the excess of
revenues over expenditures in a business transaction[.] ' 39 The dictionary
definition of "business transaction" is even less helpful: "ta]n action that
affects the actor's financial or economic interests, including the making of
a contract."' ' 4 A literal reading of these definitions would bring all marital
economic transactions (other than those for internal consumption) into the
realm of "business for profit." As one scholar noted, "the family can be
viewed as an economic subsystem that uses the paid and unpaid time of
333 See Oettinger v. Oettinger, 474 U.S. 912, 913 (1985); DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN,supra note
238, § 71.
334 See Lanza v. Lanza, 898 So. 2d 28o, 285 (La. 2005) ("A community enterprise is a busi-
ness that is not a legal entity." (quoting LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2oo))).
335 Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 66o (I95O). In Wissner, the court went on to observe
that "Venerable and worthy as [using community property to support spouse and child] is,
it is not, we think, as likely to justify an exception to the congressional language as specific
judicial recognition and particular needs, in the alimony and support cases." Id. The commer-
cial nature of the community property marriage set it apart from the common law jurisdiction
marriage where the court may have been willing to infer an intent by Congress not to preempt
state law. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 632-33 (1987).
336 Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 632 (1987).
337 RUPA § 202 (1997); UPA § 6(1) (1914). Contra DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-1 oi(il)
(2005) ("'Partnership' means an association of two or more persons... to carry on any business,
purpose or activity." (emphasis added)).
338 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 31 1, at 255 n. I.
339 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009).
340 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 227 (9th ed. 2009).
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productive members to provide both market and home-produced goods
and services for all members."'
l
It may be helpful to think of marriage in terms taught in a first year
economics course. Recall the products possibility frontier, opportunity costs,
and comparative advantage. Under principles of comparative advantage,M
couples can exploit the various skills and economic opportunities of each
partner to grow the wealth of the domestic economy (marriage in this
case).M3 In purely economic terms, marriage allows specialization, increased
economies of scale, and substitution of lower market-wage domestic
productivity which permits the higher market-wage earner an increased
opportunity to participate in the marketplace. 344 To be blunt, historically
this meant lower market-wage females specialized in domestic drudgery so
that higher market-wage males had the "leisure" to place work first, work
overtime, and dedicate themselves to wage-slavery. This model achieves
one of the goals of marriage as an economic unit: the pursuit of every higher
standard of living (increased income and wealth). This should be sufficient
to establish a "for profit" motive in marriage associations.
345
B. Federal Tax Law Consequences
The tax treatment of assets owned by the marriage-partnership under
the proposed business-entity model is one possible area of concern.
Probably the most salient difference among forms of business entities is
how they are treated for federal tax purposes.346 Under federal tax law,
a partnership is treated as a pass-through entity, and the income earned
by the partnership whether distributed or not is taxed to the individual
partners. 3 7 Of note, the tax code has options for married couples engaged
in the conduct of a business. For example, if both a husband and wife
materially participate in a business and file a joint tax return they may elect,
not to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes and would not have to file
341 HEATHER L. Ross & ISABEL V. SAWHILL,T1ME OFT ANSITION: T14E GROwTH OF FAMILIES
HEADED BY WOMEN I66 (1975); see also Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part , 81 J. POL.
ECON. 813, 815 (1973) (using economic theory to understand cohabitation relationships: "'[Ml
arriage' simply means that they share the same household."). See generally GARY S. BECKER, A
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 20-30 (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed., 1991).
342 Seegeneraly DOMINICK SALVATORE, ECONOMICS 315-319 (4th ed. 1974).
343 Seegenerally Elena Bardasi & Mark Taylor, MarriageandWages: A Test of the Specialization
Hypothesis, 75 ECONOMICA 569 (2OO8).
344 Id. at 57o; Becker, supra note 341, at 815.
345 JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 493 (I2th
ed. 2009) ("Profit accrues only when the value of the good produced is greater than the value
of the resources used for its production.").
346 Although state tax law is a significant aspect of any sound financial planning, it would
add a level of complexity to the analysis that is well outside the scope of this article.
347 See 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2oo6).
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a partnership tax return.348 This shows that under some scenarios, a court
could treat the marriage as also constituting a business entity partnership
without tax consequences to the divorcing individuals. Alternatively, if
treating the partnership as a traditional business entity partnership for tax
purposes is more advantageous, the divorcing partners may elect to follow
that route.349 These progressive tax rules do not yet apply to same-gender
married couples or individuals living in a cohabitation relationship.3 0
Consequently, couples outside a legally privileged marriage will have to
rely on the default partnership tax rules. 31 Still, though these couples will
be required to file a partnership tax return because the partnership is pass-
through entity for tax purposes, this is a mere formality and will not change
the incidence of the tax burden.3"'
V. JOINT-AUTHORSHIP OR WORK-FOR-HIRE
In the previous section, this article demonstrated that a community
property marriage might be reconceptualized in part as a business entity
partnership. This section will analyze how federal copyright law treats
works made by author-spouses in relation to the marital construct and
whether copyright law provides for authorial forms that are consistent with
treating the author-spouse as an employee of the community property
entity partnership. As discussed previously, state -domestic relations laws
may render problematic the characterization of works created during
marriage as works by an individual author. Courts have not properly
considered whether other statutory forms of authorship contemplated
by the Copyright Act might better meet the expectations of the creative
couple. This section will analyze whether works created during marriage
might be best considered as either joint-works or works-for-hire. Under
modern copyright law, the initial ownership of the protected work belongs
to either a natural person author or the hiring part as author, if it is a work-
for-hire. The work-made-for-hire section of the Copyright Act deems the
348 Bonnie Lee, How to File Taxes When Your Spouse Is Your Business Partner, Fox Bus.
Small Bus. Center (Nov. 25, 2o I), http://smallbusiness.foxbusinesscom/legal-hr/201 1/11 /23/
husband-and-wife-run-business-how-to-file-taxes/; see 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5 (2o2) (defining
"materially participate").
349 Id.
350 See Windsor v. United States, 797 E Supp. 2d 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing De-
fense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 1 io Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)) (stating
that the Attorney General of the United States is no longer defending the constitutionality of
the definition of "marriage" found in section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act).
351 See Windsor, 797 F, Supp. 2d at 322.
352 SeeALBERT KRITZER. ET AL., 3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MANUAL § 79:195 (May 2011)
("The taxable income of a partnership generally is computed in the same manner as that of
an individual, except that certain deductions (for example, charitable contributions, personal
exemptions, foreign income taxes, and net operating losses) are not allowed.").
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employer to be the legal author of works created for the employer without
requiring any formalities such as a written, signed, assignment agreement.
353
This section will analyze the legal authorial forms of work-made-for-hire
and joint-work, the two forms that are relevant in the context of a marriage
partnership under the 1909 Copyright Act, in order to explain why the
problems presented in this article were not issues until the enactment of
the 1976 Copyright Act. This section will then analyze the work-made-
for-hire and joint-work authorial forms under the 1976 Copyright Act.
Ultimately, this section will conclude that treating a community property
marriage as a business entity partnership and deeming the author-spouse
to be an employee of the marriage partnership entity is consistent with
existing copyright law's rules governing works-for-hire.
A. CopyrightAct of 1909
The 1909 Copyright Act is a significant starting point because in many
areas the 1976 Copyright Act is merely a codification of the existing common
law gloss on the 1909 Copyright A&Ct35 4 Unfortunately, the 1909 Copyright
Act and its predecessors are not helpful to understand the context of the
1976 Copyright Act and state family property law.355 Pre-1976 Copyright
Act, copyright law principles of ownership and authorship readily and
naturally conformed to state law principles of personal property and family
law.
356
1. Work-Made-For-Hire.-The 1909 Copyright Act did not distinguish
between works created by employees and works created by independent
contractors so long as the work was created at the, "instance and expense"
of the employer.357 However, apart from the comedic or satirical view
of marriage as one partner firmly in control (usually the distaff partner),
copyrighted works created during a marriage were probably not
comprehensible as works-for-hire commissioned by one of the spouses
because "[t]he essential factor in, determining whether an employee
created his work of art within the scope of his employment as part of his
employment duties is whether the employer possessed the right to direct
and to supervise the manner in which the work was being performed."3s'
353 See discussion infra Part V.B.
354 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 51 (976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664,
5679, 5693.
355 See Nevins, Jr.,supra note 7 at 390.
356 See id. at 382.
357 See Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir.
1966).
358 Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.zd 497, 50 (2d Cir. 1969).
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2. Joint-Works.-The concept of "joint-work of authorship" exists in
both the 1909351 and 1976 Copyright Acts. The most significant difference
between the law of joint-authorship under the 1909 Copyright Act and the
current law involves the present intent of the authors to create a joint-work.
Under the 1976 Act, each author must have a present intent at the point
of his or her respective contribution to the new work to merge his or her
contribution with another's, so that the sum of the individual contributions
results in a unitary whole. 36° In contrast, there was no such requirement
under the 1909 Act.361 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, the authors' intent
did not have to be concurrent with the creation of the claimed joint-work.3 61
It was even possible for a work that was created with no intention that the
work would ever become part of a joint-work to be merged into a joint-
work if the author (or even a subsequent copyright owner) later assented to
an addition or a change to the work by another author.3 63
3. Effect of the Copyright Act of 1909 on Transfers by Operation of Law.-
Fortunately, however, because the 1909 Copyright Act contained few
formalities for the transfer of a copyright," allocation of property interests
at the dissolution of the marriage never resulted in a quagmire of ownership
disputes. The Act's lack of formalities also meant that states were free then
to transfer copyright under operation of state law.365 The initial fixation of
the work under the 1909 Copyright Act, if protected at all, was protected
under state common law copyright, and this protection continued until
general publication of the work.3" State law solely governed transfers or
assignments of "copyrights" in unregistered works.3 67 In fact, while the
assignment of a registered copyright had to be in writing, the assignment of
359 See generally HOWARD B. ABRAMs, I THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4:34 (2oi I).
360 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6); see Thomson v. Larson, 147 F3d 195, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1998);
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F2d 500,507-o8 (2d Cir. 1991).
361 SeeABRAMS, supra note 359, §§ 4:33-34.
362 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 16I F.zd 406, 409-10 (2d
Cir. 1946).
363 See, e.g., id. at 410.
364 Copyright Act of 19o9, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, io84 (repealed 1976); see Magnuson v.
Video Yesteryear, 85 F3d 1424, 1428 (9th Cir. 1996).
365 See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogery, 664 F Supp. 1345, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Brecht v.
Bentley, I85 F. Supp. 890 (S,D.N.Y. I96O) (intestate succession), aff'd, 984 E2d 1524 (9th Cir.
1993), rev'don other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); 13 C.J. Copyright and Literary Properly § 245
(1917) ("[Tihe transfer of copyright may be effected either by opetation of law or by violuntary
assignment.").
366 Although this is commonly referred to as state common law copyright, some states
had state copyright statutes. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:1 (2008).
367 MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 5:33 (2011).
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a state common law copyright could be made orally3 6 or through conduct,369
and at least one case held that the mere "possession of the manuscript by
the plaintiff is evidence of his ownership .... -370 As a creature of state
law, the state could transfer the common law copyright through operation
of state law. Many works that were ultimately federally registered, then,
began their lives enjoying state common law copyright, and states have a
right to establish the process by which state rights are divested. Because
the federal registrant under the 1909 Act is the legal successor to the state
common law copyright rights, the registrant was entitled to common law
ownership rights initially conveyed by state law.371
B. Copyrnght Act 0f1976
The 1976 Copyright Act established a new rubric to distinguish works-
made-for-hire from other forms of authorship and redefined the concept of
joint-works.37 Now, the copyright to a work prepared by an employee for
the employer that is within the employee's scope of employment is a work-
for-hire.3 73 Additionally, a specially commissioned work that falls within
one of nine statutorily defined eligible types of works and is made pursuant
to an express written agreement signed by both parties (or their agents)
also counts as a statutory work-for-hire. 374 A copyrighted work that meets
the statutory definition of work-for-hire results in the legal fiction that
the employer or commissioning party is the author of the work; therefore,
the title to the copyright initially vests in the employer or commissioning
party.3
75
This legal fiction leads to the perhaps distasteful question of whether
one can legally view the author-spouse as the employee of the marriage/
368 PATRY supra note 36, § 5:106.
369 Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("It is well-settled, however, that the transfer of the 'common law copyright' in unpublished
works did not have to be in writing but could be oral or inferred from conduct.").
370 Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publ'g Co., 44 F Supp. 754, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
371 See Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, zo6
F3d 1322, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 2000).
372 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737-38 (1989) (work-
made-for-hire); Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3 d 962, 968 (9th Cir.
2oo8), ceri. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009) (joint-work).
373 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) (defining "work made for hire"); id. § 201(b); Cmty.for Creative
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 738.
374 17 U.S.C. § 1o ("A 'work made for hire' is[] ... a work specially ordered or commis-
sioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other au-
diovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.").
375 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2oo6); see generally Part V.B (discussing work-for-hire authorship).
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business partnership. Earlier in this article, marriage was divided into
two distinct institutions: the romantic partnership (internal production
and consumption) and the business partnership (external production and
trade). 76 The romantic partnership is responsible for the intimate and social
aspect of the marriage, and the business partnership is responsible for the
external commercial relations of the couple. An author-spouse could be
considered an employee of the commercial partnership. Moreover, there
is no requirement that the non-author-spouse or the marital partnership
exercise control over the author-spouse. To the degree that control or the
right of control was required under the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress in the
1976 Copyright Act rejected the 1909 Copyright Act case law that focused
on control, right of control, or instance and expense tests as dispositive
elements of whether a work is a work-for-hire and substituted the
Restatement Second of Agency test.3 7
Revisiting the earlier hypothetical,37 s Lexi, Annie, and Toby agreed
that Lexi would provide Toby with financial support and that Annie would
provide other in-kind support. In exchange, Toby would write a book, and
when the book was published, they agreed to split the profits from the book
(and any derivative works). The question is now to whom the copyright
belongs as the author. There are two possibilities: either it belongs to Toby
as the individual author or to the Lexi-Toby-Annie Partnership as a work-
for-hire.379 The determination of authorship (and, necessarily, of initial
ownership) under the Copyright Act will pivot on whether Toby was an
employee working within the scope of his employment or an independent
contractor.
380
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the work-for-hire
provisions of the Copyright Act in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid.38 1 The Court established that under the 1976 Copyright Act, the
Restatement (Second) Agency § 220 test is the appropriate multi-factor
test to determine the employment status of an author.3"' In determining
whether a hired party is an employee or an independent contractor, Reid
directs courts to evaluate a non-exclusive list of factors that includes
the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
376 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
377 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742-43.
378 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
379 17 U.S.C. § 1o (defining a "work made for hire"); 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b). As there
was no writing, ownership could not have been transferred by assignment to the partnership.
See Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-57 (9th Cir. 199o).
380 See Cmiy. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737-38; Warren v. Fox Family World-
wide, Inc., 328 E3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
381 Cmiy. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
382 Id. at 751-52.
[Vol. 1I
LOVE'S LABOR'S LOST
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is
part of the regular business of the hiring party;.., the provision
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired parry."'
Courts usually will only consider the factors they deem relevant under
the facts of the case.38' In Aymes v. Bonelli, the Second Circuit found that
[Tihere are some factors that will be significant in virtually
every situation. These include: (1) the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required;
(3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of
the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party. These factors will
almost always be relevant and should be given more weight in
the analysis, because they will usually be highly probative of the
true nature of the employment relationship.
385
Concededly, the § 220 Restatement of Agency test is designed for skilled
tradespeople, and its application in the context of copyright law and highly
creative individuals (sometimes called dominant employees or superior
servants) may be a bit strained.386 But courts have recognized that highly
creative individuals may also be employees of the institutions that they
themselves create and manage.387
Determining whether an author-spouse is an independent contractor or
an employee of the marriage partnership in order to determine authorship
and copyright ownership will require a fact specific analysis of each couple,
each author, each marriage, and perhaps each work created within the
marriage. Although this section will briefly mention all of the factors, in the
real world a court would determine which factors were the most relevant
under the facts of the specific case. Courts. do not merely sum up the
winners and losers on the individual factors when determining whether
383 Id.
384 E.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 86i (2d Cir. 1992). Of course, some courts weigh
some factors more heavily than others. See id.
385 Id.
386 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 22o (1958). The Restatement recognizes this
problem by noting that "It]he word indicates the closeness of the relation between the one
giving and the one receiving the service rather than the nature of the service or the impor-
tance of the one giving it." Id. § 220 cmt. a.
387 See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contempo-
rary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3 d 624,639-40 (2d Cit. 2004). This is a common practice in Hollywood
to hire talent through a "loan out" corporation where the talent is legally employed by a loan
out corporation or entity that is also owned by the talent. See, e.g., Matthau v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. App. 4th 593, 6oi-02 (2007).
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a work is a work-for-hire under the Copyright Act. Rather, each factor is
weighed individually.
The first factor, "the source of the instrumentalities and tools," will
likely slightly favor finding the spouse to be an employee because the
family will probably provide the tools (in Toby's case, perhaps a personal
computer).
The second factor, "location of the work," is likely to favor finding the
author-spouse an employee, if the author spouse works at home.
The third factor "the duration of the relationship between the parties,"
is likely to favor the author-spouse being the employee of the partnership.
The fourth factor, "whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party," is likely to be weighed neutrally in
the context of the marriage partnership. However, there would probably be
an expectation of continued productivity and the creation of new works in
the marriage.
The fifth factor, "the extent of the hired party's discretion over when
and how long to work," is likely to be weighed neutrally. Authors write
when the muse requires they write and may not have a set production
schedule.
The sixth factor, "the method of payment," would 'be regular support
from the non-author spouse and weigh in fav6r of the author-spouse being
an employee.
The seventh factor, "the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants," may to some degree be joint decisions and weigh in favor of
finding the author-spouse is an employee.
The eighth factor, "whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party," weighs in favor of the author-spouse being an employee
since one of the reasons that the partnership exists is to permit the spouse
to create new works.
The final two factors, "the provision of employee benefits" and "the
tax treatment of the hired party," will depend on the financial planning of
each couple.388
It is important to note that courts have been very generous to the
putative employer when analyzing whether to consider a work as being
a work-for-hire; as long as the work is created during the period of the
employment and in some tangential manner furthered the interests of the
employer, it is usually considered a work-for-hire, even if the work was
388 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 752-53.
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created at home, outside office hours, at the employee's personal expense,
and using the employee's own equipment:
3s9
Many talented people, whether creative artists or leaders -of
major corporations, are expected by their employers to produce
the sort of work for which they were hired, without any need for
the employer to suggest any particular project. 'Instance' is not
a term of exclusion.as applied to specific works created within
the scope of regular employment. It may have more significance
in determining whether an employee's work somewhat beyond
such scope has been created at the employer's behest or to serve
the employer's interests[.1" 310
Therefore, the partnership (other spouse) might exercise only the most
attenuated control or even no control over the author, yet the author-
spouse could still be considered an employee under copyright law.391
If the spouse is an employee and the work is created is within the
scope of the employment, 39 then the legal author is the partnership. The
legal status of a copyrighted work as either a work-for-hire or a work of a
natural person has significant legal ramifications. First, a work-for-hire is
not protected under the Visual Artists Rights Act.393 Second, the duration
of copyright is different. Ninety-five to 120 years is the statutory term of
protection for a work-for-hire.3 9 In contrast, the term for a work whose
legal author is a natural person is the life of that author plus seventy
389 See Le v. City of Wilmington, 736 E Supp. 2d 842, 848-51 (D. Del. zolO) (citing
further supportive cases).
390 Martha Graham, 380 E3d at 640-41.
391 See id. at 642 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(I) cmt. a (1958)).
392 Because the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement of Agency test for employ-
ment in Cmly. for Creative Non-Violence 490 U.S. at 740, it is likely to use the following defini-
tion from the Restatement to determine the scope of employment:
(i) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the
use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servantis not within the scope of employment if it is different
in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or
too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. at 740 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)). Therefore, it is likely that a
court will find works made for the marriage partnership to be works made for hire within the
scope of the author's employment.
393 Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F3 d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) (defin-
ing a "work of visual art"); see also Nathan Murphy, Thime et VARAations: Why the VisualArtists
Rights Act Should Not Protect Works-In-Progress, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 110, 145-53 (2010)
(discussing the economic implications of moral rights).
394 17 U.S.C. § 302(C) (2oo6).
2012-2O13]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
years.3 9s Finally, the author-spouse of a work-for-hire may not exercise
termination of copyright transfer rights.396 This alone may make the work-
for-hire authorial form more consistent with the share-and-share-alike
community property model because the author-spouse cannot terminate
the transfer of the work to the community and frustrate the non-author
spouse's expectations under principles of community property law.
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress vests authors and their
statutory heirs with the right to terminate transfers of copyrights that
were granted to third parties so as to recapture the alienated copyrights.3 97
Under some circumstances this is a potentially significant economic
right.398 However, while some works will remain valuable forever, the vast
majority of copyrighted works have, only nominal economic value thirty-
five years after the initial transfer of the copyright by the author.399 The.
community property marriage as business entity partnership proposed in.
this article is not obligatory; even if adopted, it will be merely a default
rule. The marital couple could change from the default of marriage-as-
business-partnership creating works-for-hire to the romantic author form
of the marital relationship. Moreover, considering the relative economic
insignificance of the work-for-hire doctrine on many creative works, the
economic advantages, if any, to the marital community of retaining.the
romantic authorship will be easily outweighed by the economic advantages
of predictable copyright ownership and surety of rights. Further, the non--
authorial spouse will also not face the ever-looming threat of a termination
of copyright transfer to the marital community.
CONCLUSION.
Copyright law is federal law and as such it preempts inconsistent state
laws. Several provisions of the 1976 CopyrightAct conflict with state domestic
relations law and the allocation of community property in a divorce. Courts
and commentators have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid preempting
these inconsistent state domestic relations laws. The easiest solution is
for Congress to amend theCopyright Act. However, despite numerous
revisions of the Copyright Act, Congress has failed to make the necessary
395 Id. § 302(a).
396 See id. § 203.
397 Id.; see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 n.39 (1985).
398 See, e.g., Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 E Supp. 2d 1o98 (C.D. Cal. 2oo8).
(terminating a transter of "Superman"); Archie Comic Publ'ns, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 258 F. Supp.
zd 3x5 (S.D.N.Y. zo 3 ) (discussing characters in Archie Comics).
399 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 267-68 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing); EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING
THE ECONOMIC VALUES 6-15 (May I 1, 1998), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/98-
I44-1998051 i.pdf (describing such works as "outliers").
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changes. Alternatively, there could be a significant change in state domestic
relations law. There is little likelihood of this happening, though, because
states are unwilling or unable to exclude an author-spouse's copyrights
from community property as a-species of separate property. Courts insist on
treating copyrights as community property. Once an institution is defined
as "marriage," it becomes the gold standard against which all other laws
and legal institutions must be proven." Other, institutions are measured
against it, found wanting, and then the judge like Procrustes stretches or
lops off the limbs of other bodies of law to force them. to conform to an
idealized romantic norm of marriage. Copyright law has suffered such a
fate-one court made a non-author spouse a joint-owner 401 while another
court severed the author's statutory copyrights from the economic benefits
from the exercise of these property rigfits4 2 ---and since the other six
community property states have not yet spoken, there is, still room for new
judicial theories of copyright ownership in community property states.
This article suggests harmonizing copyright law and community
property law through the artifice of deconstructing a community property
state marriage into its two constituent elements: a romantic partnership
that produces goods and services for it internal consumption and a business
entity partnership that produces goods and services for trade and profit.
This novel solution has the advantage of not analytically subordinating
federal copyright law to state domestic relations law. Moreover,'it can
be accomplished without a change in statutory law. The proposed
reconceptualization of the community property marriage as a business
partnership is consistent with Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, and it is also consistent with the economic
realities during marital dissolution proceedings invoiving an author-spouse
ih many community property jurisdictions. Under this reconceptualization,
the community author-spouse is now treated as an employee of the marital
community partnership. The Copyright Act has provisions for allocating
interests in a work-for-hire. In the case of a work-for-hire, the employer
is. legally the author. Since under the Copyright Act the community-
property-marriage-as-business-partnership is deemed to be the author
for all purposes, the allocation of the economic interests in copyright in
a divorce action is the same as the allocation of the copyright interests
in dissolving a conventional business entity partnership. The business
partnership work-for-hire model also does not rely on the laws of any
one state so it can be applied in different states having different domestic
relations laws. Moreover, this model promotes auniform distribution of the
copyright interests since copyrighted works created as works-for-hire are
400 See United States v. Lopez, 514"U.S. 549,564-65 (1995) (stating family law appears to
limit Congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
401 In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
402 RodriguelI, 218 F3d 432, 435-36 6sth Cir. 2000).
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not subject to the author-spouse's termination of copyright transfer rights.
Therefore, this solution recommends itself because it relies on the well-
established partnership model that is consistent with the goals of property
equality in community property jurisdictions, and it is consistent with the
policies expressed by Congress in the Copyright Act.
